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THE FIRST AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE: 
THE EMERGENCE OF FREE SPEECH IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
G. Edward White* 
INTRODUCTION 
As the number of issues perceived as having First Amendment im­
plications continues to grow, and the coterie of potential beneficiaries 
of First Amendment protection continues to widen - including not 
only the traditional oppressed mavericks and despised dissenters but 
some rich and powerful members from the circles of political and eco­
nomic orthodoxy - alarms have been sounded. Another period of 
stocktaking for free speech theory appears to be dawning, and some re­
cent commentators have proposed a retrenchment from the long twenti­
eth-century progression of increasingly speech-protective interpretations 
of the First Amendment. At the heart of the retrenchment literature lies 
the belief that some forms of expression are incompatible with the aspi­
rations of contemporary Americans for a civic-minded, decent, compas­
sionate, and responsible society. 1 
One might attribute to the contributions of retrenchment advocates 
an implicit questioning of the special constitutional and cultural status 
of free speech in America. Such a reading invites parallels between the 
perspective of retrenchment commentators and a much older view of 
the status of speech. That view was embodied in an often anthologized 
attack on Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States2 made by 
John Wigmore in 1920. In his attack Wigmore distinguished between 
"Freedom of Speech" and "Freedom of Thuggery," and maintained 
* University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, Univer­
sity of Virginia. B.A. 1963, Amherst; M.A., Ph.D. 1967, Yale; J.D. 1970, Harvard. -
Ed. My thanks to Vmcent Blasi, Mary Anne Case, Barry Cushman, Stephen J. Feldman, 
Jack Goldslnith, Mark Graber, Thomas Andrew Green, John Harrison, Michael Klar­
man, Alfred S. Konefsky, Peter Linzer, Robert Post, David Rabban, John Henry Schle­
gel, and Michael Seidman for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks 
also to Cathleen Curran for research assistance. An early draft of the article was 
presented at the Faculty Workshop at the University of Vrrginia School of Law. I appre­
ciate the constructive irreverence with which many of my colleagues reacted to the 
presentation. 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 270-92 (discussing relevant sources). 
2. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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that a civilized society such as the United States, whose members en­
joyed ample freedoms, had the capacity to distinguish those utterances 
that enhanced the body politic from those that corroded it. Wigmore 
suggested that American citizens had a moral, as well as a legal, right 
to repress speech that passed the boundaries of civilized interchange 
and accordingly threatened the fabric of the community.3 
I am not primarily interested here in exploring the parallels be­
tween Wigmore's perspective on free speech and that exhibited by cur­
rent retrenchment advocates. Nor is my central concern with the sali­
ency of various arguments advanced in retrenchment commentary. The 
recent proposed retrenchment of libertarian free speech theory has stim­
ulated me to consider a broader issue: How did free speech, and the 
First Amendment, come to be treated as special, both constitutionally 
and culturally, in America? 
It is remarkable, given the significant attention to First Amendment 
issues in legal commentary, that no detailed explanation for the special 
status of free speech in twentieth-century America hitherto has been ad­
vanced. It is conventional wisdom in current constitutional jurispru­
dence that the First Amendment, and the idea of protection for free 
speech, have been regarded for several decades as being at the very 
center of the American constitutional enterprise, whereas before World 
War I both the First Amendment and the idea of freedom of speech oc­
cupied a far more marginal status. Moreover, because of the increasing 
anthologization of some important work on the role of free speech in 
the late nineteenth century, scholars and students have a clearer under­
standing of the "prehistory" of modem First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 4 
But as yet no comprehensive inquiry has been undertaken into the 
question of why the First Amendment and freedom of speech "came of 
age," that is, came to occupy the status of constitutional and cultural 
3. See John H. Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Free­
dom of Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539, 552-54 (1920). 
4. The most significant contributors have been David Rabban and Mark Graber. 
See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY 
OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern 
First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1205 (1983) [hereinafter Rabban, Emer­
gence]; David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 
514 (1981) [hereinafter Rabban, Forgotten Years]; David M. Rabban, The Free Speech 
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 
STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992); David M. Rabban, The /WW Free Speech Fights and Popu­
lar Conceptions of Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1994); 
David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795 (1985) (reviewing LEONARD W. 
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss (1985)). 
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lodestars, in twentieth-century America.5 This article attempts such an 
inquiry, and in the process seeks to revise some conventional wisdom 
on a related subject: the origins and evolution of the bifurcated review 
project, in which constitutional challenges to legislative infringements 
on property rights or economic activity received a lower level of judi­
cial scrutiny than constitutional challenges to legislative infringements 
on noneconomic "rights" or "liberties." 
Specifically, I argue in this article that the most complete and sat­
isfactory account of the twentieth-century jurisprudential and cultural 
emergence of the First Amendment and the idea of freedom of speech 
is one that associates the elevation of speech to special status with the 
emergence, in the early years of the twentieth century, of a "modern­
ist" consciousness. This modernist consciousness bore a distinctive re­
lationship to democracy and capitalism, the two prominent political and 
economic models of what I call "modernity. "6 
In addition, I argue that the bifurcated review project, convention­
ally identified as beginning with Chief Justice Stone's celebrated "foot­
note four" in the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,1 
5. Michael K.larman's article, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo­
lutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1 (1996), demonstrates an awareness of the absence of histori­
cal inquiries into the emergence of free speech as a particularly important constitutional 
and cultural concept in twentieth-century America, and offers a preliminary hypothesis 
for making sense of that emergence. See id. at 34, 39-41. K.larman's hypothesis attaches 
significance both to particularistic political and economic coalitions within American 
culture in the period between World War I and World War II and to the effect of those 
coalitions on constitutional litigation and the process of judicial appointment. 
This explanation, insofar as it stresses the role of World War I as a cause of altered 
attitudes toward speech, tracks an argument made by Rabban. See Rabban, Emergence, 
supra note 4, at 1213-16, 1313-15. The importance of World War I also is emphasized 
in the work of the leading historian of free speech in twentieth-century America, Paul 
Murphy. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
FmsT AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM Wn.soN TO FDR 4, 21-22 (1972). That hy­
pothesis is not inconsistent with the explanatory framework set forth in this article, but I 
believe it is incomplete. The question is not only why, after many years, Congress 
sought to restrict speech in statutes passed against the backdrop of World War I, but 
also why those statutes were challenged on constitutional grounds, and why a new, 
more speech-protective approach to the First Amendment emerged as a result of the 
challenges. The wartime context of the cases, which accentuated the negative conse­
quences of allegedly "subversive" speech, might have suggested otherwise. 
In short, previous commentators have tended to suggest that free speech emerged 
to a position of constitutional and cultural stature because of factors external to the al­
tered intellectual meaning of the concepts of "freedom" and "speech" themselves. This 
article suggests that a full explanation of the rise of the First Amendment to constitu­
tional and cultural prominence also must explore the nature of that altered intellectual 
meaning. 
6. For definitions of modernist consciousness and modernity, see infra text accom­
panying notes 8-17. 
7. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
302 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:299 
began several years earlier and was centered on speech cases. I also ar­
gue that although the expanded governmental regulatory apparatus that 
emerged in the early twentieth century was a necessary condition for bi­
furcated review, it was not a sufficient condition: on a theoretical level, 
that regulatory apparatus could have been accommodated through judi­
cial deference to legislative regulation of all types of constitutionally 
based liberties. Bifurcated review emerged with the perception that 
speech was a special sort of liberty and deserved particular judicial so­
licitude in a modem democratic society. 
Finally, I argue that as the progression of twentieth-century free 
speech jurisprudence has played itself out from the early twentieth cen­
tury until the present, the original, self-reinforcing modernist premises 
that elevated speech to special status in America have fragmented and 
become self-opposing. This development potentially threatens not only 
the enhanced role of speech but the intelligibility of the bifurcated re­
view project itself. 
My argument is presented in the form of an intellectual history of 
free speech theory in twentieth-century America, with particular atten­
tion to the contributions of prominent commentators advancing succes­
sive rationales for giving special protection to speech. The primary pur­
pose of that history, however, is not to describe the views of those 
commentators, whose contributions are familiar to students of First 
Amendment issues. It is rather to trace the emergence, and subsequent 
refinement and fragmentation, of the central intellectual premises driv­
ing twentieth-century free speech jurisprudence, and thus to establish 
the existence of a paradox that current First Amendment theorists must 
now confront When everyone can speak, and everything can be said, 
speech has ceased to be special. 
I. A DEFINITIONAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this Part I set forth the framework for the intellectual history of 
First Amendment jurisprudence that follows, including definitions of 
some recurrent terms. I make no effort at this point to detail the connec­
tions between what I call modernist consciousness and the successive 
rationales for the protection of free speech that are discussed in this ar­
ticle. As a consequence, the framework may appear somewhat abstract. 
It seems useful, however, to prefigure the orientation of my argument in 
advance, and to suggest where its emphasis will differ from those of 
conventional accounts. 
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A. The Premises of Modernist Jurists 
"Modernist" and "modernism" are ubiquitous and multifaceted 
terms that have been associated with the emotive as well as the cogni­
tive realms of consciousness, and with developments in the arts, the hu­
manities, and the sciences. This article focuses generally on the connec­
tions between modernism and unfolding doctrinal and theoretical 
developments in twentieth-century First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Given the professional orientation of the leading participants in that his­
tory - all writers about law - I both follow and depart from the help­
ful recent characterizations made by Dorothy Ross, 8 and hence I employ 
the term modernist in a particularistic fashion in this article. 
I use the term "modernist" to identify a perspectival orientation, 
or consciousness, characterized by a distinctive set of culturally and 
temporally bounded starting intellectual premises. Ross associates mod­
ernist consciousness with "the turn-of the-[nineteenth-] century recogni­
tion of the subjectivity of perception and cognition. "9 David Hollinger 
expands upon Ross's definition by equating modernist consciousness 
with an "enthusiasm" for "the cognitive capability of human beings," 
around which "[a] distinctive culture uniquely appropriate for modem 
society" could be "organize[d]."10 I accept Ross's and Hollinger's gen­
eral formulation, but it requires some particularization as applied to the 
legal writers I survey in this article. Whereas Ross and Hollinger note 
that some modernists in the arts and humanities treated the discovery of 
innate subjectivity as a source of alienation and skepticism, a basis for 
recoiling from modernity, the modernist writers on law whom I discuss 
assumed that the cognitive capabilities of humans would be a source of 
enlightened, human-fashioned policymaking, provided that policies 
were grounded in rationality and empirically based truth. 
Thus the orientation of the modernist legal writers I consider 
closely resembles that ascribed to certain American political scientists 
by Raymond Seidelman, who identified adherents of a "philosophy of 
modernism" in the discipline of political science between 1884 and 
8. Dorothy Ross's introduction to her edition of a series of interpretive essays on 
modernism represents in my judgment the clearest and most cogent effort to define and 
locate modernist consciousness that has yet appeared. See Dorothy Ross, Modernism 
Reconsidered, in MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1870-1930, at 1 
(Dorothy Ross ed., 1994). Another helpful collection of essays is MODERNIST CUL­
TURE IN AMERICA (Daniel Joseph Singal ed., 1991). 
9. Ross, supra note 8, at 8. 
10. David A. Hollinger, The Knower and the Artificer with Postscript 1993, in 
MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 8, at 26, 32 (emphasis 
omitted). 
304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:299 
1984. Modernist philosophy, Seidelman suggested, rested on the as­
sumption that once scientific knowledge had been acquired, "conflicts 
thought to be endemic to modern society could be rationally controlled, 
mediated and contained justly, equitably, and democratically."11 The el­
ements of modernist consciousness central to my subjects are identified 
in Seidelman's characterization: the value of scientific knowledge, the 
importance of rationality, and the significance of the democratic process 
in furthering individual freedom of thought. I am calling these elements 
cognitive freedom, rationalism, and empiricism.12 
The modernist writers surveyed in this article took humans to be 
"free" in the deepest sense: free to master and to control their own 
destinies. In holding this "freedom premise" they were rejecting a heri­
tage of causative explanations for the universe that emphasized the 
power of external, nonhuman forces, ranging from God to nature to in­
exorable laws of political economy or social organization to determinist 
theories of historical change. For them a recognition of the subjectivity 
of perception and cognition meant much more than the belief that indi­
vidual humans were capable of giving individual meaning to their life 
experiences. It meant that humans had the potential - the freedom -
to alter those experiences. 
But in this group of modernist judges and commentators the free­
dom premise was subjected to two distinctive constraints. The con­
straints trace back to the fact that the group inhabited the professional 
sphere of practical policymaking. The recognition of cognitive human 
subjectivity was more than a stunning epistemological insight for them; 
it had potentially ominous governance consequences. Radical subjectiv­
ity, coupled with the brute fact of power, appeared to revive two of the 
endemic problems of governance in past societies - tyranny and arbi-
1 1 .  RAYMOND SEIDELMAN, DISENCHANTED REALISTS: POLITICAL SCIENCE 
AND THE AMERICAN Crus1s, 1884-1984, at 9-10 (1985). 
12. I use the term "cognitive freedom" to distinguish those dimensions of human 
subjectivity directed toward the processes of "knowing" or "thinking" from those di­
rected toward "emoting" or "feeling." See Hollinger, supra note 10, at 28-29. The ver­
sion of subjective freedom exemplified in "aesthetic modernism," which Ross and Hol­
linger identify primarily with responses in literature and the arts, see Ross, supra note 8, 
at 8; Hollinger, supra note 10, at 28, was not a central element in the consciousness of 
most of the writers I am describing. 
Nonetheless the "freedom" associated with human subjectivity by modernist writ­
ers was taken to include emotive as well as cognitive dimensions, so that the premises 
of modernist consciousness implicitly conferred legitimacy on individualized aesthetic 
responses to experience. Over time the emotive dimensions of modernist "freedom" 
were to become incorporated in rationales for the protection of speech in American 
First Amendment jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes 225-45. To signal 
the emergence of that stage, I will replace the term "cognitive freedom" with the term 
"freedom." 
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trariness. Those features of premodern societies, when they existed, had 
been justified by appeal to externally based theories of causal attribu­
tion ("the King can do no wrong," "God's will"), but such theories 
hitherto were rejected. How was the modern world, largely created by 
humans themselves - a world in which democracy had replaced oligar­
chy, capitalism had supplanted feudalism, science increasingly over­
shadowed religion, and an essentially frozen status system had been 
made increasingly mobile - to restrain the power of human will? 
To deal with the potential connection between the freedom premise 
and the prospect of tyrannical or arbitrary governance, modernist jurists 
incorporated two constraints on the creative power of humans to func­
tion as causal agents into their consciousness - rationalism and empiri­
cism.13 Both ultimately helped cement the symbiotic relationship be­
tween modernism and an elevated status for the First Amendment. 
The constraint of rationalism posed a central distinction between 
laws, rules, and policies that were arbitrary and those that were rational. 
A rational decision, for modernist American jurists, was one that was 
defensible and justifiable by appeal to something other than the power 
and creative force of those making it.14 "Rationality" could be located 
in the "common sense" of the people, as reflected in legislative judg­
ments, or, increasingly in the twentieth century, in the "expertise" of 
administrators, but it could not be located merely in the fact of 
powerholding itself. 
The freedom of humans to fashion rules or policies guiding their 
own conduct also was constrained, for modernist jurists, by a require­
ment that legal decisions be grounded in an appropriately empirical un­
derstanding of the subjects affected by the decisions. The methodology 
of empiricism had come into prominence with the emergence of science 
as an important key to understanding the external world. It was based 
13. Hollinger identifies rationalism and empiricism with the cognitive dimensions 
of human subjectivity, encapsulating those premises in the figure of the scientist, a 
"modern, intersubjective, empirical, professional Knower" who "eschew[s] imaginary 
certainties and comforting illusions in order to face relentlessly the truth, developing 
• . .  capacities for skepticism, disinterestedness, and rigorous analysis." Hollinger, 
supra note 10, at 37. Early twentieth-century American jurists often defined law as a 
science and viewed an important task of their profession as responding to the uncer­
tainty and complexity of modern life by making the law more scientific. For a detailed 
account of the infatuation of early twentieth-century legal academics with empirical so­
cial science, see JOHN HENRY SCI-ll..EGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRI­
CAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). 
14. For discussions of the relationship of r;itionalism to modernist consciousness, 
see RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 275-90 (1991); Den­
nis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 263-64 
(1992). 
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on an assumption that through appropriately learned techniques of ob­
servation and deduction, finite, objective truths about the universe could 
be ascertained. As such, empiricism was a check on the radical subjec­
tivity of perception, but the insights of empiricist methodology were not 
available to all: they required specialized training in the techniques that 
elicited "truth." Thus alongside a commitment to the constraint of em­
piricism went a faith that the truths unearthed by experts presumptively 
were worth more than those of the lay public.15 
B. Modernist Consciousness and Rationales for the Protection of 
Speech 
Much of the remainder of this article will demonstrate how each of 
the starting premises of modernist consciousness influenced the devel­
opment of free speech jurisprudence in America. Before taking up the 
details of that process, however, it is worth pointing out two additional 
analytical themes that frame the twentieth-century intellectual history of 
free speech. 
The first of those themes focuses on the connections between the 
premises of modernist consciousness and the major philosophical ratio­
nales for the protection of free speech in American society that surfaced 
over the course of the twentieth century. 
I have suggested that the freedom premise of modernist conscious­
ness emphasized the capacity of humans to master their experience and 
in effect to create their own destiny: it was a powerful affirmation of 
the capacity and potential of the individual. The philosophical rationale 
for protecting speech most intimately associated with the freedom pre­
mise would appear to be one emphasizing speech as a particularly fun­
damental component in the affirmation of human freedom. That ratio­
nale eventually surfaced in free speech jurisprudence under the heading 
of individual autonomy or self-fulfillment. However, for historical rea-
15. In a recent history of the idea of democracy in America from the 1820s to the 
1990s, Robert Wiebe argues that the decade between 1914 and 1924 was one in which 
two developments occurred in the realm of ideas about democratic theory: a loss of 
confidence in "the people" as a repository of wisdom, with a corresponding rise in the 
status of experts as enlightened policymakers; and a shift in the normative thrust of de­
mocracy from an emphasis on majority rule to an emphasis on expanded opportunities 
for individuals. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 175-84 (1995). I will argue that a reformulation of the cul­
tural meaning of democracy in America bore a close relationship both to the emergence 
of modernism and to the expanded significance of free speech. Although I did not have 
the benefit of Wiebe's observations in the process of developing that argument, and al­
though his emphasis differs slightly from mine, his findings parallel and support my 
own. 
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sons, the self-fulfillment rationale was comparatively late to surface in 
First Amendment doctrine and commentary. 
The rationalism premise of modernist consciousness sought to 
channel the freedom of human creativity along paths compatible with 
effective and orderly governance. Rationalism, as a constraint on free­
dom, suggested that not all versions of human mastery in the universe 
were conducive to effective social organization; tyrannical and arbitrary 
policies were, in fact, destructive of that goal. Analogically, not all ex­
amples of the power and creativity of humans in the form of free ex­
pression were useful; those retarding the formation of rational policies 
of governance were inefficacious. Thus one can grasp an affinity be­
tween the premise of rationalism and a second philosophical rationale 
for the protection of speech, one that emphasized the channeling of self­
expression toward the processes of rational policymaking. This rationale 
was to appear in free speech jurisprudence under the rubric of "self­
governance. '' 
Finally, the empiricism premise of modernist consciousness sought 
to impose upon the process by which humans extract meaning from 
their experience a requirement that the meaning be "true" as distin­
guished from "false," lest the potentially radical dimensions of cogni­
tive subjectivity precipitate anarchic or excessively willful interpreta­
tions of the external world. Empiricist techniques for observing and 
generalizing about the universe were to be one of the chief sources of 
true meanings. It followed from this commitment to empiricism as a 
check on unlimited interpretive freedom that the principal value in free­
dom of expression was as part of a process designed to distinguish true 
ideas from false ones, what might be called a collective process of gath­
ering information and distinguishing the true from the false meanings of 
that information. The philosophical rationale for the protection of free 
speech most akin to the empiricist dimensions of modernist conscious­
ness was a rationale that emphasized freedom of expression as part of a 
"search for truth" in the "marketplace of ideas."16 
Chronologically, the three principal rationales for protection for 
freedom of speech did not surface simultaneously in twentieth-century 
First Amendment jurisprudence. The search for truth rationale came 
first, to be followed by the self-governance and self-fulfillment ratio­
nales. When one asks questions not only about the connections between 
16. The "marketplace of ideas" was itself a testament to the cognitive capabilities 
of human beings. Ideas were propounded by human actors and tested and found want­
ing by human actors. No externally based truths overwhelmed those discerned by the 
actors participating in the marketplace. Of course, as we shall see, the modernist jurists 
being surveyed concluded that some human-discerned truths were better than others. 
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the rationales and modernist consciousness, but about possible explana­
tions for the chronology of the rationales' appearance, one must con­
sider not only the intellectual premises that engendered the rationales 
but their historical setting. One must explore not only modernist con­
sciousness but the "actual world" of modernity itself. 
C. The Emergence of Free Speech and the Bifurcated Review Project 
The First Amendment came of age in America at a particular point 
in time. That period was characterized not only by the emergence of a 
modernist consciousness, but by the presence of external features in 
American culture that bore a generative relationship to that conscious­
ness. According to Ross, modernity can be exemplified, in important 
part, by a democratic model of politics and a capitalist model of eco­
nomics.17 However, the status of those models, at the time free speech 
was first taken seriously as a constitutional and cultural value in 
America, was not identical. 
As First Amendment jurisprudence became progressively speech­
protective - beginning around World War I and stretching at least to 
the 1980s - the democratic model of politics expanded in influence. At 
the same time the capitalist model of economics, in its idealized late 
nineteenth-century version of a laissez-faire economic marketplace 
characterized by the absence of governmental regulation, receded in in­
fluence. As the meaning and normative significance of democracy ex­
panded, the model of capitalism as unregulated economic activity sepa­
rated from democratic theory. Freedom in the political sphere became 
embodied by democratic theory and practices, 18 but freedom in the eco­
nomic sphere was pictured increasingly as producing inequitable distri­
butions of power and wealth. Indeed, regulation of the economic mar­
ketplace became associated with democratic theory.19 
The increasing influence of the democratic model of politics rela­
tive to the capitalist model of economics was reflected in a fundamental 
development in American constitutional jurisprudence. The emergence 
of free speech as constitutionally and culturally special was intimately 
17. See Ross, supra note 8, at 8. 
18. This transition was affected, as Wiebe suggests, by practices that emphasized 
the opportunities of the individual citizen as a participant in collective governance. See 
WIEBE, supra note 15, at 137. 
19. Identification of the themes of an expanding conception of political democracy 
and a contracting conception of economic freedom as defining elements of the political 
economy of early and mid-twentieth century America can be found in nearly any stan­
dard history of that period. See, e.g. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 344-47 (1963); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932. at 8-9 (2d ed. 1993). 
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tied to that development. I am calling that development the bifurcated 
review project - an effort to fashion a double standard of constitu­
tional review in which judges would defer to legislative regulation of 
the economy but scrutinize legislative regulation of noneconomic rights, 
including the right to free speech. The basis for that heightened scrutiny 
was the close connection between the freedom personified in 
noneconomic liberties and democratic theory. The basis for judicial def­
erence to legislative regulation of economic rights was similar. Such 
deference not only alleviated fears of an undemocratic substitution, 
under the guise of constitutional interpretation, of judicial for legislative 
theories of the economy, it left in place legislative regulations designed 
to alleviate the undemocratic consequences of the unregulated economic 
marketplace. 
The bifurcated review project represented an effort to give concrete 
effect to modernist premises. By fostering judicial deference in the area 
of economic regulation, the project embraced the perceived truth that 
unregulated economic activity actually infringed on the freedom of a 
significant number of actors in the economic marketplace and rein­
forced rational regulatory policies that were based on that truth. By fos­
tering judicial scrutiny of legislative restrictions on speech and other 
noneconomic liberties, the project underscored the centrality of the 
modernist freedom premise when that premise could be associated with 
the goals of democratic theory. 
The evolution of free speech jurisprudence in twentieth-century 
America thus can be seen as a series of episodes in which the major 
premises of modernism, as interpreted by courts and commentators, 
successively contributed to elevate the constitutional and cultural status 
of free speech. At the same time, as those episodes produced alternative 
rationales for the protection of speech, those rationales began to conflict 
with, as w�ll as to reinforce, one another, and eventually came to 
threaten, as well as to implement, the juristic goals of the bifurcated re­
view project. The sharp separation between the juristic realms of 
noneconomic and economic freedom had been the essence of the bifur­
cated review project and arguably the essence of an enlightened mod­
ernist approach to modernity. But as protection for speech began to dis­
engage itself from democratic political theory and to invade the realm 
of economic regulation, this sharp separation began to blur. The result 
has been to stimulate a reconsideration of the significance of speech in 
America. 
My narrative of the First Amendment's coming of age divides the 
twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech into five discrete 
periods, in each of which an analysis of commentary and cases reveals 
310 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:299 
the existence of distinct, but overlapping, jurisprudential rationales for 
the protection of speech. fu the first four periods, that progression ex­
hibits an increasingly libertarian, speech-protective First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and an increasingly aggressive role for courts in constitu­
tional review of free speech claims. fu the last period, which includes 
the present, the libertarian progression has continued, but the associa­
tion of a speech-protective approach to First Amendment issues with 
democratic theory and with an implicit deference to economic regula­
tion has become much less easy to discern. The tendencies of recent 
free speech jurisprudence have fostered calls for a reconsideration of its 
libertarian emphasis, and, arguably, for a less elevated constitutional 
and cultural role for speech. The article concludes by suggesting that 
this movement signals the deeply paradoxical and problematic status of 
modernist-driven free speech jurisprudence.20 
II. COGNITIVE FREEDOM AND "THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH": 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SPEECH­
PROTECTIVE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. The Setting: Early Twentieth-Century Doctrinal and Theoretical 
Orthodoxy 
As late as 1915 the Supreme Court of the United States continued 
to treat free speech cases as undeserving of special judicial solicitude. 
Two venerable doctrinal formulations continued to control First Amend­
ment jurisprudence. One was the position, represented in the 1897 case 
of Robertson v. Baldwin,21 that the Amendment did not institute "any 
novel principles of government," but simply codified "certain guaran­
ties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, 
and which from time immemorial had been subject to certain well-
20. It remains, in this introductory section, to locate this article within recent liter­
ature on the twentieth-century history of the First Amendment. Although I believe that 
the explanation offered here for the emergence of free speech in twentieth-century 
America is novel, it builds not only on the aforementioned work of intellectual histori­
ans on modernist consciousness and modernity, but on other recent work at the inter­
faces of "new institutionalist" political science, philosophy, and constitutional history, 
samples of which are cited in subsequent notes. I want to single out here the contribu­
tions of two of my colleagues, Michael Klarman and Barry Cushman, whose interest in 
twentieth-century constitutional and intellectual history has stimulated me to reexamine 
my approach to those fields. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and 
the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7 (1994); Klarman, supra note 5; Barry 
Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from 
Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 154 (1992); Barry Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201 (1994). 
21.  165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
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recognized exceptions." This meant that speech that was regarded as 
libelous, blasphemous, obscene, indecent, or "injurious to public mora1s 
or private reputation" could be suppressed. 2 2  
The other formulation confined constitutiona1 protection for free 
speech to freedom from governmenta1ly imposed "prior restraints," 
such as the censorship of publications before they were issued. This po­
sition dated back at least to William Blackstone's Commentaries, in 
which Blackstone had defined "the liberty of the press" as protection 
only from "laying no previous restraints upon publications," as distin­
guished from "freedom from censure for crimina1 manner when pub­
lished. "23 In a 1907 case in which a Colorado newspaper editor had 
been convicted of contempt of court for publishing articles and a car­
toon impugning the motives of judges of the Supreme Court of Colo­
rado, the Court upheld the conviction. The author of the Court's opinion 
was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who repeated Blackstone's prior 
restraints dictum and held that even factually accurate (true) criticism of 
judicia1 officia1s that tended to interfere with the administration of jus­
tice could be crimina1ly punished. 24 
The Supreme Court cases up through Patterson made free speech 
cha1lenges to state or federa1 restrictions simple "police power" cases. 
The test for whether the police power of the state could be invoked to 
punish expression was whether the expression in question had a "bad 
tendency" - that is, a tendency to injure public mora1s or private repu­
tation or lead to other socia1ly injurious acts. Under this conception, 
most free speech cases, which involved restrictions formulated by 
states, were not First Amendment cases at all, but Fourteenth Amend­
ment due process cases, testing the boundary between a liberty claim 
and state police powers. Since the First Amendment had not been incor­
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the lib­
erty at stake was simply one of the ancient "rights" of English­
speaking citizens. 25 
22. 165 U.S. at 281. 
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 .  
24. See Patterson v .  Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 456, 462-63 
(1907). 
25. Recent scholarship has revealed the existence of a tradition of libertarian com­
mentary on issues implicating freedom of expression that can be traced back to the 
years before the Civil War. In particular, groups such as the Free Speech League and 
the International Workers of the World had initiated, by the early years of the twentieth 
century, the practice of scrutinizing and challenging restrictions on speech in the press 
and in public debate; by the early twentieth century libertarian theories of free speech 
had begun to appear in "mainstream" academic writing. See sources cited supra note 4. 
Late nineteenth-century libertarian free speech theory, however, cannot be seen as 
fully reflective of a modernist consciousness. That commentary saw freedom of speech 
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As a police power liberty, absolutist formulations of speech 
seemed as potentially distasteful as "liberty of contract" when that doc­
trine came under attack from early twentieth-century Progressive legal 
theorists. The first instinct of many Progressive commentators, in fact, 
was to continue to sweep free speech issues within the rubric of police 
power analysis, and to emphasize the social interest in restricting dissi­
dent speech to promote progress and civic harmony.26 
The premodemist dimensions of libertarian free speech theory be­
came significant when Congress, in the shadow of World War I, passed 
two statutes that criminalized speech tending to encourage resistance to 
the war effort or to undermine respect for the government and its opera­
tions. 27 Indictments under those statutes raised the question, dormant for 
so many years, of what the First Amendment's imprecation that "Con­
gress shall make no law . . . abridging speech" meant in a wartime 
setting. 
The Supreme Court's 1919 decisions in a series of Espionage Act 
and Sedition Act cases, beginning with Schenck v. United States28 and 
extending through Abrams v. United States,29 are among the most an-
as a liberty akin to that of the due process liberty: a private right, such as property, that 
in some contexts had an important public function such as disseminating information or 
opinions on public issues. It was conceived of as an innate, prepolitical liberty, one of 
the essential conditions of humanity but not in itself an illustration of the cognitive ca­
pabilities of humans. 
Recent scholarship also has shown increased attention to the theoretical dimensions 
of late nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence, and particularly to the fascina­
tion of that body of work with bright-line doctrinal categories designed to maintain a 
fundamental distinction between the public and private spheres of social activity. See, 
e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE 
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 10-15 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW]; Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Fonvard: The Constitu­
tion of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 
30, 101-03 (1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 10 N.C. L. REv. 1, 8, 23-24 (1991). Nonetheless very little at­
tention has been devoted to grounding the categorical orientation of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century constitutional theory in premodernist assumptions about the cognitive 
capabilities of humans as causative agents in the realm of political economy. For a pre­
liminary effort, attempting to cabin James Bradley Thayer's deferential theory of judi­
cial review in time, see G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 48 (1993). 
26. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 78-86; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Pro­
gressive Social Thought, 14 TEXAS L. REv. 951, 958-59 (1996). 
27. See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat 217 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.); Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat 553 (repealed 
1921). 
28. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
29. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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thologized cases in American constitutional law. In Schenck Holmes an­
nounced for the Court that "[t]he question in every [subversive advo­
cacy] case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they 
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre­
vent. "30 Holmes restated this test in Abrams, in dissent.31 
I am concerned here with how Espionage Act and Sedition Act 
cases provided a forum for a reconsideration of nineteenth-century free 
speech jurisprudential orthodoxy. That reconsideration, prompted 
largely by the writing of Zechariah Chafee - particularly his glosses 
on the Espionage Act opinions of Holmes - served to integrate and to 
give new meaning to the diverse strands of free speech commentary 
that were in existence by World War I. It also served to supply First 
Amendment jurisprudence with its first modem set of theoretical apolo­
getics, which associated protection for speech with a search for truth in 
a democratic society.3 2 
30. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52. 
31. "[T]he United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is 
intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith cer­
tain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent." 
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The restatement was not insignificant, 
and a good deal of commentary has been devoted to the development of Holmes's per­
spective on free speech issues in the short interval between Schenck and Abrams. I re­
view that commentary and discuss the internal history of Holmes's altered perspective 
in G. EDWARD WmTE, JusTICE OLIVER WENDELL Hou.ms: LAW AND THE INNER 
SELF 414-36 (1993). 
32. This article's emphasis on the role of Chafee and other legal commentators in 
formulating rationales for the protection of speech, and in illustrating one or another of 
the starting premises I have identified with a modernist juristic consciousness, raises 
two questions about the place of such commentators in an intellectual history of consti­
tutional concepts such as freedom of speech. The first question is what weight, if any, 
can be attached to the views of commentators, given that they are not judges and thus 
have no power to interpret the Constitution. The second is why the starting intellectual 
premises of any particular commentator should be singled out as "representative" of a 
larger body of opinion, so that, for example, the theoretical dilemmas illustrated in the 
work of a given commentator can be seen as emblematic of dilemmas contained within 
twentieth-century American juristic modernism itself. 
I assume that the work of certain legal commentators does exert influence on con­
stitutional interpretation, and I have attempted to chronicle that influence in this article. 
In the cases of Zechariah Chafee and Alexander Meiklejohn such influence is readily 
documented, and by doing so I intend to suggest that the writings of Chafee and 
Meiklejohn had considerable influence on the theoretical grounding of Supreme Court 
First Amendment cases even though both Chafee and Meiklejohn spent their careers as 
academics. 
My selection of the other two commentators, Thomas Emerson and Cass Sunstein, 
is designed more to emphasize their role as "representative" intellectual and cultural 
figures than as formative influences on judicial interpretations of the First Amendment. 
I single out Emerson and Sunstein because I think that their respective approaches to 
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The Espionage Act decisions of 1919 were handed down during an 
important transition period in the intellectual history of twentieth­
century American jurisprudence. The first distinctly modernist political 
movement in America, Progressivism, had become established, and so­
ciological jurisprudence, the legal ideology of early twentieth-century 
Progressives, had captured the attention of some sectors of the legal 
academy.33 A notable dimension of sociological jurisprudence was its 
critique of what Roscoe Pound called "mechanical jurisprudence": the 
late nineteenth-century juristic emphasis on bright-line legal categories 
and concepts.34 The sociological jurists' critique of the Court's majority 
opinion in Lochner v. New York,35 which they viewed as paradigmati­
cally mechanical, was itself paradigmatically modernist. Lochner was 
attacked for being insufficiently attentive to the "realities" of the indus­
trial marketplace, and thus irrational; and at the same time for perpetu­
ating outmoded assumptions about the coexistence of economic "free­
dom" and democratic theory in a society where industrial capitalism 
was the dominant model of enterprise.36 
One feature of the Lochner decision that made it notorious for Pro­
gressive critics was its embrace of the doctrine of "liberty of contract," 
which signified to them either a fiction or a nineteenth-century confu­
sion of economic power with economic liberty. Having assumed that 
liberty of contract was neither conceptually nor practically defensible, 
modernist critics concluded that it functioned simply as a tool that 
judges could employ to invalidate statutes that they felt threatened the 
idealized domain of unregulated economic activity. This conclusion, of 
course, also posited a modernist view of the judicial function as crea­
tive.37 As Holmes had pointed out in his dissent in Lochner, liberty of 
free speech issues clearly reveal their intellectual starting premises, and that those prem­
ises can be shown to be illustrative of stages not only in the progression of twentieth­
century First Amendment jurisprudence but in the progression of twentieth-century 
modernism. 
33. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru­
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 
1004 (1972). 
34. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908); 
see also HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 25, at 10-19 
(describing the category-based tendency of nineteenth-century legal thought); David N. 
Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Lais­
sez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1990); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1431. 
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
36. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 464, 479-81 
(1909). 
37. The modernist recognition of human cognitive capabilities can be seen as sig­
nificantly contributing to the collapse of the established jurisprudential assumption that 
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contract was itself a judicial gloss on the Due Process Clauses.38 
The modernist critique of liberty of contract suggested that a read­
ing of the Due Process Clauses to develop a libertarian position toward 
speech rights might be comparably susceptible to judicial abuse, and 
might take on some of the baggage of an interpretive approach that was 
being attacked as outmoded.39 But the instinctive attraction of some 
Progressive scholars toward the idea of freedom of speech stimulated 
them to try to reconcile a theory of curtailed constitutional protection 
for economic liberties, embodied in the critique of Lochner, with a the­
ory of expanded protection for freedom of expression in a democracy. 40 
That attempted reconciliation eventually blossomed into the project of 
bifurcated constitutional review. 
With the approach of World War I, some Progressive commenta­
tors increasingly became concerned with the implications of dissident 
speech for political and cultural solidarity.41 Certain other Progressive 
theorists, however, had begun to associate protection for free speech 
with the value of enhanced citizen participation in an industrializing, 
democratizing society. One of the political goals of the Progressive 
movement was to broaden the base of popular involvement in govern­
ment and to encourage larger numbers of citizens to participate in pub­
lic discourse, even though many Progressives held a selective view of 
who those citizens should be.42 The modernist premise of freedom was 
a thread linking many policies endorsed by Progressives, ranging from 
enhanced bargaining power for workers in the industrial marketplace to 
opposition to machine politics to enthusiasm for new scientific tech­
niques that would relieve the drudgery of workplace and household rou-
judges merely "found" or "declared" law. That assumption can be identified with a 
theory of causal attribution in the universe that located omnipotent causal agents, such 
as disembodied principles of law, in entities and forces external to human will. For an 
earlier effort to characterize the theory of judicial law declaration, described as an 
"oracular theory of judging," and to trace its demise in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmoN 
145-77 (expanded ed. 1988). 
38. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
39. One of the nineteenth-century commentators that had articulated a relatively 
libertarian perspective on free speech issues was Thomas Cooley, one of the visible pro­
ponents of the "liberty of contract" doctrine. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 8, 241 
n.39. On Cooley's general jurisprudential orientation see GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 
55-59. 
40. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 87-95; Rabban, supra note 26, at 957-62. 
41. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 77-86. 
42. See ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LosT PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 193-95 
(1994); WIEBE, supra note 15, at 162-65. 
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tines.43 Freedom of speech, from this perspective, signified freedom of 
political participation and freedom of inquiry. 
B. Chafee and the Reformulation of First Amendment Orthodoxy 
As Progressive legal scholars sought to square their enhanced in­
terpretation of freedom in a democracy with their increasing alienation 
from what they saw as an excessively libertarian constitutional heritage, 
Zechariah Chafee began his own reformulation of free speech jurispru­
dence. In his 1920 treatise, Freedom of Speech,44 which was prompted 
by the Espionage Act cases, Chafee employed three strategies as part of 
his reformulation effort. First, he discarded the legacy of earlier libertar­
ian speech theorists by treating their work as largely invisible, thereby 
helping to cement the image of pre-World War I First Amendment juris­
prudence as a period in which free speech issues were not given any se­
rious attention.45 Second, he attempted a sharp separation of First 
Amendment free speech jurisprudence, which he sought to invigorate, 
from the legacy of police power liberty due process cases, which he 
sought to discard. Finally, Chafee restated the philosophical rationale 
for protecting free speech in America - resting protection for speech 
on a "social interest" in enhanced public participation and informed 
public debate in a democracy rather than on an individual interest in 
self-expression. His reformulation supplied First Amendment jurispru­
dence with the first of its twentieth-century bases for a speech­
protective perspective: that protection for speech facilitated a search for 
truth in the marketplace of ideas. 
Chafee took pains to disassociate the liberty of speech and the 
press from liberty of contract, and did so in a fashion that revealed his 
modernist sensibility. He announced that his goal was to disengage the 
"true meaning of free speech" from "talk about rights."46 In cases such 
as the Espionage Act cases, he argued, "[t]he agitator asserts his consti­
tutional right to speak [and] the government asserts its constitutional 
right to wage war":  the "result is a deadlock."47 Breaking this deadlock 
required discarding the jurisprudence in which "free speech has been 
regarded as merely an individual interest" and adopting an analysis em-
43. For examples of the policies see generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH 
FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967). 
44. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). 
45. The legacy discarded by Chafee was reclaimed by those scholars who recently 
have documented the existence of late nineteenth-century libertarian free speech com­
mentary. See sources cited supra note 4. 
46. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 34-35. 
47. Id. at 34. 
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phasizing "the balancing against each other of two very important so­
cial interests," that of "public safety" and that of what Chafee called 
"a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not 
only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest 
way."48 
In another place in Freedom of Speech Chafee was to equate the 
social interest in protecting free speech with "the need of continuous 
contact with the facts and with sound conclusions. "49 Freedom of 
speech led to truth, he believed, because the outpouring of ideas stimu­
lated other ideas to be proposed as counters or correctives, and the re­
sulting dialogue led its participants closer to the true facts of life.50 
The normative bite of Chafee's proposed reformulation of free 
speech jurisprudence was captured in a sentence reading, "[T]he great 
interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in 
public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it 
is barely conceivable that it may be slightly affected. "51 Chafee sug­
gested that even in wartime, speech should be protected "unless it is 
clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference with the con­
duct of the war. "52 One might notice how this formulation asserts a 
great social interest in free speech, a comparable social interest in pub­
lic safety, and then looks to empirical analysis (when is the safety of 
the public really imperiled?) on which to ground a rational process of 
balancing. By comparison the "bad tendency" test ("when it is barely 
conceivable that [public safety ] may be slightly affected") appears un­
duly vague, subjective, and irrationally underprotective of speech in 
wartime. 
In the short run, Chafee's reformulation had far greater impact on 
theory than doctrine. His proposed test for determining whether speech 
48. Id. at 36-38. In placing emphasis on social interests Chafee benefited from his 
close contact with Progressives like Roscoe Pound. In his early twentieth-century schol­
arship Pound had suggested that to the extent that legal "interests" were "balanced" in 
a judicial decision, they needed to be balanced on the same plane, so that "social inter­
ests" were balanced against "social interests." See Roscoe Pound, Interests of Person­
ality (pt. 1), 28 HARV. L. R.Ev. 343, 344, 349 (1915). By giving "individual interests" 
the same potential weight as social interests, Pound felt, judges were being insuffi­
ciently sensitive to the contemporary social and economic consequences of their deci­
sions. It invited the kind of "mechanical" analysis embodied by the majority opinion in 
Lochner. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 
3), 25 HARv. L. R.Ev. 489, 492-95 (1912). On Chafee's connections with Progressive 
thinkers, see DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY 
AND LAW 81-84 (1986). 
49. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 179. 
50. See id. at 36. 
51. Id. at 38. 
52. Id. 
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should be protected, which was influenced by Learned Hand's holding 
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,53 was not adopted by the Supreme 
Court in the Espionage Act cases. Even though Chafee roundly criti­
cized the bad tendency test in free speech cases,54 Holmes employed it 
for the Court in all the Espionage Act cases except Abrams, where the 
majority employed it.55 At least until Abrams, Holmes did not appear to 
treat his celebrated "clear and present danger" dictum in Schenck56 as 
incompatible with the bad tendency test.57 
Chafee, however, intimated that the Court adopted his reformula­
tion as early as the Espionage Act cases. He repeated in Freedom of 
Speech a conclusion he had advanced earlier in an article, Freedom of 
Speech in Wartime, in the Harvard Law Review.58 There Chafee wrote 
that in Schenck and the companion Espionage Act cases, in order to 
give force to the First Amendment, "Justice Holmes draws the bound­
ary line very close to the test of incitement at common law and clearly 
makes the punishment of words for their bad tendency impossible."59 
This was what Chafee took Holmes to mean by "clear and present 
danger." 
Chafee took pains to suggest that Holmes's reformulation in 
Abrams was "only an elaboration" of his dictum in Schenck. Chafee 
was eager to bring Abrams within the "clear and present danger" line 
of cases so that the doctrine would be linked with "Justice Holmes's 
magnificent exposition of the philosophic basis" of the First Amend­
ment. 60 Holmes wrote in his Abrams dissent: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda­
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and 
53. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), revd., 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Hand held in that 
case that only speech that constituted a "direct incitement to violent resistance" is ille­
gal. 244 F. at 540. Chafee dedicated the 1920 edition of Freedom of Speech to Hand. 
54. See CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 25-32. 
55. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
56. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
57. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 418-20 (discussing Holmes's use of "bad ten­
dency" language and analysis in two Espionage Act cases following Schenck). 
58. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 
(1919). Chafee had published an earlier version of this article. See Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1918, at 66. 
59. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 58, at 967. In his book 
Freedom of Speech, Chafee made a nearly identical statement. See CHAFEE, supra note 
44, at 89. 
60. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 155. 
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that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be car­
ried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.61 
Chafee was enthusiastic about this passage because Holmes clearly had 
elevated the social interest in the search for truth as a foundation for 
civic policymaking over any individual interest in expression. The "ul­
timate good," Holmes suggested, was "free trade in ideas" rather than 
the "foundations" of individual conduct. Individual "faiths" were 
ephemeral, but the search for truth in the marketplace of ideas was per­
manent, since truth was "the only ground" upon which policy could 
"safely" be made. 
Holmes's articulation in Abrams of the search for truth rationale 
for protection of speech has regularly been celebrated as a def'ming mo­
ment in the modern history of the First Amendment. Chafee himself 
played a part in encouraging Holmes to rethink his view of free speech, 
and scholars recently have come to realize the significant role Chafee 
played in Holmes's adoption of a more speech-protective approach.62 
But there has been little discussion of the extent to which the concept of 
a search for truth in the marketplace of ideas can be connected to mod­
ernist starting premises. 
1\vo controlling assumptions appear to guide the famous words 
from Holmes's Abrams dissent: that truth is the only basis on which ef­
fective policy can be made, and that the "truth" of ideas is determined 
simply by their survival in the marketplace. If ideas are essentially im­
permanent and contextual, why would not the collective meaning of 
truth also be? And if the truth of ideas were determined by their sur­
vival in the current marketplace, why would that process produce any­
thing other than the temporary elevation of majoritarian beliefs as to 
what was true? In short, how could Holmes and Chafee imply that truth 
61. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
62. Between the decisions in Schenck and Abrams, Harold Laski and Felix Frank­
furter, two Progressive acolytes of Holmes who had come to believe in the enhanced 
importance of protection for free speech, had made Holmes aware of criticism of his 
opinion for the Court in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), where he had up­
held Eugene Debs's conviction under the Espionage Act for a speech in which he 
stated, "I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone." 249 U.S. at 214. That 
decision was difficult to square with Holmes's "clear and present danger" language in 
Schenck, and Ernst Freund had published an article that was highly critical of Holmes's 
opinion. See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, 
May 3, 1919, at 13. Stimulated by conversations and correspondence over the summer 
of 1919, with Frankfurter, Laski, and Learned Hand, Holmes began reading literature on 
free speech, and in July met Chafee at a tea arranged by Laski. For the details of 
Holmes's engagement with Chafee's writings and others on the subject of free speech in 
the spring and summer of 1919, see WIDTE, supra note 31, at 420-30 and sources cited 
therein. 
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had any meaning independent of the collective prejudices of the 
market? � 
It is possible to read Holmes's Abrams dissent as a forthright ex­
pression of majoritarian fatalism, a reading some of his own comments 
tend to support.63 This reading, however, is oversimple. To a limited ex­
tent Holmes, and to a greater extent Chafee, sought to distinguish what 
they meant by "truth" from mere majoritarian prejudices. Part of 
Holmes's rationale for allowing expressions such as those suppressed in 
Abrams into the marketplace was based on an assumption that patently 
foolish expressions - "silly leaflet[s]," "poor and puny anonymi­
ties"64 - would by their very foolishness reveal their "falsity" and 
permit more sensible alternatives to emerge. At least at this stage in his 
free speech jurisprudence,65 Holmes seems to have included, within his 
search for truth metaphor, both a commitment to the free exchange of 
ideas and information in a democracy and an elitist reading of that ex­
change process, in which the surfacing of truth would be accompanied 
by a discarding of foolish ideas for rational ones. It was, after all, 
Holmes himself, not Congress, who had labeled the leaflets in Abrams 
silly. 
If Holmes and Chafee held this alternatively elitist and egalitarian 
conception of speech at the moment that the search for truth rationale 
for protection of speech first appeared,66 one could see how that con-
63. Take, for example, his definition of "truth" as "the prevailing can't help of 
the majority," Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 11 ,  1929), in 
2 Hou.ms-LASKI LEITERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 1 124 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953), quoted in 
WHITE, supra note 31, at 435, or "the majority vote of that nation that can lick all 
others." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), quoted 
in WHITE, supra note 31, at 435. 
64. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628-29. 
65. For an argument that Holmes held no consistent theory of free speech through­
out his judicial career, but rather issued a series of rhetorical formulations, not necessar­
ily consistent with one another, that demonstrated an increasingly speech-protective em­
phasis in his jurisprudence, see WHITE, supra note 31,  at 412-54. 
66. Such a view is harder to square with a statement made by Hn1mes in a later 
free speech opinion that if "the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined 
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is not clear by this sentence 
whether Holmes meant to embrace only the process of exchanging ideas in the market­
place or all results that the marketplace produced. If the latter, he would appear to be 
content with repression of speech by the "dominant forces of the community" in those 
instances in which those forces accepted the "beliefs expressed in proletarian dictator­
ship" and such beliefs favored repression. 
Attributing the above view to Holmes makes one of his subsequent definitions of 
free speech, as "freedom for the thought that we hate," hard to understand. United 
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ception would square with the starting premises of modernist conscious­
ness, in which the creative freedom accorded humans as a consequence 
of their cognitive capabilities was constrained by the obligations of ra­
tionality and empiricism. Some ideas would necessarily be superior to 
other ideas because they were predicated on a scientifically accurate un­
derstanding of the defining social and economic facts of a civilization at 
a point in its history. Being empirically grounded, they took on the 
character of truth. Being true, they lent a dimension of rationality to the 
public policies they produced, making the wishes of policymakers capa­
ble of being carried out safely. 
Despite Chafee's and Holmes's efforts, the marketplace theory of 
free speech and the "clear and present danger" formula for speech 
cases only slowly became orthodoxy. Chafee's and Holmes's formula­
tion faced two interrelated problems. The first was a practical one: de­
spite Holmes's claim in Abrams that "clear and present danger" was 
the Court's test for determining whether speech in a given case had 
been subversive, a majority of the Court continued to equate clear and 
present danger with the established bad tendency test.67 At the time of 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Moreover, in discussing the pacifist sen­
timents that had caused Rosika Schwimmer to be threatened with deportation, Holmes 
noted to Harold Laski that "[a]ll 'isms [including pacifism] seem to me silly - but this 
hyperaethereal respect for human life seems perhaps the silliest of all." Letter from Oli­
ver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS, 
supra note 63, at 1146, quoted in WHITE, supra note 31, at 583 n.292. So I am inclined 
to believe that implicit in Holmes's marketplace of ideas rationale for protecting speech 
was an elitist view of that market silly ideas simply would not prevail. Such a view, of 
course, equates freedom of speech not only with empirically based truth but with an as­
sumption that the process of exchanging ideas eventually produces rational outcomes. 
As for Chafee, his statement that he could not sit down for half an hour's conver­
sation with the great majority of persons who had spoken out against the war "without 
losing [his] temper," but that he wished to see them treated consistently with the princi­
ple of freedom of speech, could be read as combining similar elitist and egalitarian in­
terpretations of the marketplace of ideas. See CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 2. 
67. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Fiske, in which the 
Court unanimously invalidated a conviction under the Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act 
for soliciting members of a local branch of the International Workers of the World, used 
the same bad tendency test and adopted the same police power balancing analysis as 
had Gitlow and Whitney. It presumably reached a different outcome from the majority 
opinions in those cases because the only evidence offered by the state was a copy of the 
preamble to the IWW's constitution, which stopped short of advocating unlawful 
activity. 
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Holmes's retirement from the Court in 1932, only Justice Louis Bran­
deis had joined him in repudiating the bad tendency formula.68 
The second problem was methodological. Chafee had insisted on 
abandoning police power methodology in speech cases for a balancing 
of the social interests in public safety and the search for truth in a dem­
ocratic society. At the same time he had claimed that Holmes had de­
signed the clear and present danger test to draw a boundary line be­
tween protected and unprotected speech claims. The methodological 
ambiguities in Chafee's formulation crept into the clear and present 
danger test itself. 
It was not obvious, for example, that shifting to social interest bal­
ancing in speech cases would have normative effects consistent with 
greater protection for speech. It might, in fact, have the opposite effect. 
Cases such as Gitlow v. New York, which reviewed a New York statute 
providing criminal penalties for those who advocated "that organized 
government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful 
means,"69 appeared to pose particular problems for Chafee's social in­
terest balancing methodology in speech cases. In such cases legislative 
majorities had "balanced" in advance and had deemed the espousal of 
a particular ideological position "subversive" to democratic institutions 
and thus not contributing to the search for truth in a democracy. When 
judges came to consider such legislation in light of the First Amend­
ment, their characterizing the interest in freedom of expression as a so­
cial interest might suggest, when a legislative enactment was over­
turned, -that they were in a better position than legislatures to make 
decisions about social questions. This was the very suggestion that 
Progressives had deplored in decisions such as Lochner. 
Nor did the clear and present danger formula, in its marketplace 
version, seem to help in cases such as Gitlow. When the legislature had 
engaged in social interest balancing in the process of enacting a statute 
restricting speech, clear and present danger appeared to be serving sim­
ply as another category-based judicial formula, akin to such nineteenth-
68. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting & Brandeis, J., concurring in dissent), ove"uled by Girourd v. United States, 
328 U.S. 61 (1946); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States 
ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 426 (1921) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Schwimmer, Holmes's dissent, joined by Brandeis, con­
verted a routine deportation case into a free speech case. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 
445-46. 
69. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 161.2 (Matthew Bender 1909) (current version at N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 240.15 (McKinney 1989)). 
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century rubrics as "affected with a public interest. "70 Such formulas 
had served to place economic activity on one side or another of a con­
stitutional boundary line; the clear and present danger formula seemed 
to be doing the same for speech. If courts should be reluctant to upset 
legislative determinations of whether a business was "affected with a 
public interest," why should they not be equally reluctant to upset leg­
islative determinations as to whether certain speech posed a clear and 
present danger to the body politic? 
Speech-protective theory, on confronting cases such as Gitlow, ap­
peared to be forced in one of two directions. One direction involved re­
framing the rationale of protecting speech to make clear that the mar­
ketplace of ideas was not confined to collective majoritarian 
preferences. In this reformulation the social interest in protecting speech 
was more than simply an interest in allowing majorities freedom to de­
cide what speech they wanted to protect; it was also an interest in giv­
ing individual citizens in a democracy the freedom to express their 
views. 
An alternative direction was to reframe the rationale for protecting 
speech so as to link speech more closely to the democratic model of 
politics itself, and at the same time to suggest that that model was not 
embodied exclusively in the outcomes produced by legislative majori­
ties. In this formulation the significance of speech in a democracy was 
seen more as creating an opportunity for citizens to participate in the 
democratic process than as creating opportunities to speak freely as part 
of a search for collective truth. Both directions were explored in free 
speech commentary after Gitlow. 11 
C. Beyond the "Search for Truth" Rationale: Brandeis and the 
Emergence of "Self-Governance" 
In the 1927 case of Whitney v. California,12 Justice Brandeis wrote 
a passage in a concurring opinion, joined by Holmes, that also has been 
one of the most anthologized passages in twentieth-century American 
constitutional law. The Whitney case raised the constitutionality of 
Anita Whitney's conviction under a California criminal syndicalist stat­
ute for attending a convention held in Oakland to create a California 
70. On that fonnula and other categorist -:nineteenth-century fonnulas, see HOR­
WITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 25, at 17-19. 
71. Both directions are also consistent with Wiebe's observations about the in­
creasingly elitist and individualistic thrust of ideas about American democracy in the 
decade after World War I. See WIEBE, supra note 15, at 185-87. 
72. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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chapter of the Communist Labor Party.73 In upholding Whitney's con­
viction, the majority adopted a conventional police power analysis and 
concluded that the state of California had a strong interest in sup­
pressing the advocacy of doctrines designed to foment revolution. Al­
though concurring in the result, Brandeis and Holmes declared that 
Whitney had a constitutional right to associate with a political party that 
advocated "the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action at 
some date necessarily far in the future. "74 
Ill his concurrence Brandeis, after acting as if clear and present 
danger rather than bad tendency was the Court's test for evaluating 
speech claims, wrote the following: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the 
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its gov­
ernment the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They 
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. . . . They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indis­
pensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . . .  that the great­
est menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po­
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government . . . .  Believing in the power of reason as applied 
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the 
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies 
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.75 
Brandeis's paragraph achieved a fusion of two sets of arguments 
justifying protection for free speech. One set rehearsed the now familiar 
search for truth position. The other identified freedom as both "an end" 
73. The California statute prohibited any person from organizing or knowingly be­
coming a member of any organization advocating "the commission of crime, sabotage 
. . . or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a 
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any 
political change." See 274 U.S. at 359-60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, ch. 188, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 281,  281). On its face the plat­
form of the Communist Labor Party, which advocated industrial revolts and strikes, 
clearly came within the statute. For general background on the Whitney case, see Vin­
cent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion 
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653 (1988). 
74. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis and Holmes con­
curred in affirming Whitney's conviction because she had not adequately raised the free 
speech issue at her trial and because, even if one assumed that she had and adopted the 
clear and present danger test for evaluating her claim, "there was evidence on which 
the court or jury might have found that such danger existed." 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis 
& Holmes, JJ., concurring). Their decision seems quite time-bound, given the statute's 
exceptionally vague and overbroad language. Whitney was only to survive as a prece­
dent for about a decade. 
75. 274 U.S. at 375-76 (footnote omitted). 
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and "a means" and associated "freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think" with "public discussion." Notable in the passage 
were referents to the discourse of modernism: a distinction between de­
liberation and arbitrariness; an association of public discussion with the 
power of reason; and the allusions to tyranny and to coerced silence. 
The referents, however, were not contained simply in arguments on be­
half of speech as furthering the social interest in the search for truth. 
They also were contained in arguments on behalf of speech as part of 
the process by which American citizens learned how to govern 
themselves. 
Much has been written on Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney as 
marking the first impressive appearance of the self-governance rationale 
in First Amendment theory.76 I am interested here in how Brandeis's in­
tuitions about First Amendment jurisprudence provided an embryonic 
response to the principal problems encountered by Chafee's and 
Holmes's search for truth rationale as a basis for enhanced protection 
for speech. 
Brandeis made three assertions about the value of speech in 
America in Whitney: that it signified a commitment to a broader ideal 
of human freedom itself; that it furthered the discovery and spread of 
truth; and that it fostered public discussion. But in the celebrated pas­
sage from his concurrence the assertions were not treated as separable. 
Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think was linked to 
political truth; and political truth, as well as the duty of citizens to par­
ticipate in government, were linked to public discussion. Thus, the 
Whitney concurrence can be read fairly, on a theoretical level, as sub­
suming the search for truth rationale in a rationale that identified the 
principal function of speech as promoting self-governance in a demo­
cratic society. In addition, a fair reading of the Whitney concurrence is 
that it enlisted all of the central premises of modernism - embodied in 
the asserted value of freedom, the discovery and spread of truth, and the 
power of reason - on behalf of the principle of public discussion. 
If one considers these dimensions of the Brandeis concurrence in 
light of the difficulties cases such as Gitlow posed for Chafee's formu­
lation, one can see how with one stroke Brandeis was attempting to 
supply a rationale for the protection of speech devoid of any lingering 
overtones of late nineteenth-century libertarian orthodoxy. The rationale 
for protecting speech was its extraordinary value in promoting free and 
76. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 73; HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADI­
TION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 156-66 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
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rational public discussion; speech as an embodiment of other liberties 
was implicitly less central. 
One can also see that Brandeis was attempting to modify Chafee's 
analytical methodology in free speech cases. Although he retained clear 
and present danger as an evaluative standard for speech claims, his 
Whitney concurrence did not mention balancing. Brandeis spoke of 
courts "fix[ing] the standard by which to determine when a danger shall 
be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed 
present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial 
to justify resort to abridgment of free speech and assembly. "77 He an­
nounced that " [o]nly an emergency can justify repression" of speech, 
and that " [s]uch must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with 
freedom. "78 
In short, Brandeis's methodology contained two sorts of categori­
cal inquiries. At the level of doctrine, judges were to employ a fixed 
standard for interpreting the clear and present danger formula, and cate­
gorize cases as involving or not involving emergencies. More signifi­
cantly, at the level of normative theory, judges were to categorize 
speech claims as related, or unrelated, to public discussion. To make the 
implications of the latter characterization clear, Brandeis said in 
Whitney that " [t]he power of the courts to strike down an offending 
law" was "no less" in cases implicating "the fundamental personal 
rights of free speech and assembly" than in cases "where the denial of 
liberty involved was that of engaging in a particular business. "79 As we 
shall come to see, by "no less," in fact, he meant "greater." 
The categorist dimensions of Brandeis's methodology in Whitney 
suggest that he intended to turn late nineteenth-century orthodox juris­
prudence on its head. Instead of subsuming protection for personal lib­
erties in a line of arguments associated with police power property 
rights cases, he attempted to subsume protection for personal liberties in 
arguments generated by the concept of political self-governance. Bran­
deis, in short, used First Amendment cases to launch the project of bi­
furcated constitutional review. Speech rights were to be given greater 
protection against legislative infringement than property rights because 
77. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Later in his Whitney con­
currence Brandeis suggested that the standard should be a very speech-protective read­
ing of the phrase "clear and present danger," permitting legislative repressions of 
speech only when the speech posed "imminent danger" creating "the probability of se­
rious injury to the state." 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
78. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
79. 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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speech was more closely connected than economic activity to the pro­
cess of self-governance in a democracy. 
m. THE · 'PREFERRED PosrrmN''  INTERLUDE 
A. Free Speech Cases and the Bifurcated Review Project 
Commentators on twentieth-century constitutional history have ac­
knowledged the existence of the bifurcated review project but have 
tended to locate its origins in the political and economic transformations 
that eventually ushered in a much greater regulatory presence for the 
federal government after the 1932 election.80 This article has maintained 
that the project originated earlier, first with Chafee's effort to disassoci­
ate protection for speech from the late nineteenth-century legacy of ar­
guments on behalf of economic liberties, and then with Brandeis's re­
formulation of Chafee's rationale for the protection of speech in 
Whitney. Most commentary, however, identifies the origins of bifur­
cated review with two developments in constitutional jurisprudence in 
the late 1930s. 
One development was the appearance of First Amendment opin­
ions suggesting that the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion oc­
cupied a "preferred position" in constitutional jurisprudence and in 
American culture. Despite the frequent allusions to preferred position 
cases in commentary, the cases themselves have received relatively lit­
tle attention.81 The other development was then-Justice Stone's afore­
mentioned Carolene Products footnote, in which he suggested that there 
might be more searching judicial review of legislative activity when a 
statute affected rights explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitu­
tion or when it was directed at "discrete and insular minorities" whose 
status adversely affected their influence in the legislative forum.8 2 
The major impact of the Carolene Products footnote has been in 
equal protection jurisprudence, but it should be understood that the first 
paragraph of the footnote, with its attention to textually protected rights, 
provides a justification for a higher level of judicial scrutiny for First 
Amendment claims than for legislative infringements on Lochner-type 
80. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-
1969, at 172-75 (1972). 
81. The preferred position cases have received slightly more attention from politi­
cal scientists and constitutional historians. A recent treatment is Howard Gillman, Pre­
ferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern 
Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 41 POL. REs. Q. 623 (1994). 
82. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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rights. 83 Modern commentators have tended not to concentrate on this 
paragraph.84 
It has been simple enough for commentators to conclude that the 
expansion of government in the 1930s precipitated a recognition of the 
potential of government to infringe upon noneconomic rights. The 
emergence around the time of the New Deal of preferred position 
cases,85 and of the two-tiered theory of judicial review suggested in 
Carolene Products, has been seen as a natural consequence of reflec­
tions on the intrusive potential of an expanded governmental 
apparatus. 86 
83. The paragraph reads: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre­
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." 304 U.S. at 
152 n.4. First Amendment cases were clearly the model for this paragraph. It was fol­
lowed by a citation to Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931), and to 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), in each of which the Court unanimously in­
validated a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars or any other 
literature without a permit from the city manager. Moreover, correspondence between 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Stone over an earlier draft of the Carolene 
Products footnote centered on ways to distinguish First Amendment cases from other 
"liberty" cases. See Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 18, 
1933), quoted in WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTER­
PRETATION 487 (1986); Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Evans Hughes (Apr. 
19, 1938), quoted in MURPHY ET AL., supra, at 488. 
84. The following statement, from a constitutional casebook jointly authored by 
two political scientists and a law professor, represents the conventional view of the rela­
tionship of the Carotene Products footnote to the bifurcated review project 
The timing of the footnote is important. For much of the previous fifty 
years, a majority of the justices . . .  had read their economic views into and out 
of the Constitution so as to thwart both state and federal efforts to cope with the 
problems of industrial and finance capitalism. The Great Depression that en­
veloped the country in 1929 and the Court's war against Roosevelt's New Deal 
had left laissez faire - and the nation - in shambles. By 1938, the Court had 
retreated, saying it would presume economic regulation to be constitutional. This 
withdrawal . . .  raised fundamental questions about the future of constitutional in­
terpretations by judges. If they were to presume economic regulation constitu­
tional, why not all regulation? On what principles could they draw lines? 
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 83, at 473. Professor Fleming, currently on the faculty of 
Fordham Law School, was in private practice at the time the casebook was issued. 
85. The term "preferred position case" refers simply to any case in which an 
opinion of the Court used language either openly declaring that First Amendment rights 
occupied a preferred position or stating that such rights should receive greater judicial 
solicitude because of the fundamental nature of speech rights or the "indispensable con­
nection" between speech rights and democratic theory. As will become evident, the pre­
cise constitutional meaning of preferred position was never fully clarified in the 
decisions. 
86. See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 81,  at 645-46. 
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The difficulty with seeing the preferred position interlude in First 
Amendment jurisprudence as part of a natural response to the emer­
gence of expanded government in the twentieth century is that such an 
explanation supplies no intellectual basis for why a group of judges and 
jurists should have responded to expanded government by bifurcating 
constitutional review. The logic of the Lochner critique, we have seen, 
led in the direction of less judicial activism on behalf of legislatively 
regulated liberties, whatever their content. Moreover, the civil rights 
movement, with its enhanced consciousness of the oppressed status of 
minorities in America, was hardly a mainstream phenomenon in the late 
1930s.87 Thus there does not appear to be any obvious explanation for 
why Justices, such as Brandeis and those who can be identified with the 
brief development of preferred position free speech jurisprudence, 
should have concluded that although governmental restrictions on Loch­
ner-type rights were now presumptively rational, governmental restric­
tions on noneconomic rights needed to be scrutinized carefully. 
There is, however, an explanation for the emergence of bifurcated 
review that can be grounded in the language of the preferred position 
cases themselves. That explanation begins with an understanding that 
from Brandeis's 1927 concurrence in Whitney until 1942, the very time 
interval in which the Lochner majority's approach to due process cases 
was rejected88 and the Court increasingly sanctioned an expansion of 
congressional and state power to regulate the economy, 89 every Su­
preme Court case exhibiting an increased level of scrutiny of a legisla­
tive regulation was a First Amendment case.90 Moreover, many of those 
cases openly suggested that First Amendment rights should receive 
greater judicial solicitude than other rights: that was what "preferred 
position" meant. 
Finally, the cases that did assign First Amendment rights to a pre­
ferred position posited an explanation for their being singled out. The 
explanation was not fully developed: it often consisted, in fact, of a sin­
gle rhetorical assertion. But that assertion was nonetheless of real sig­
nificance in the twentieth-century history of free speech. It proclaimed 
an "indispensable connection" between free speech and the meaning of 
87. See Klarman, supra note 5, at 26-27. 
88. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937). 
89. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
90. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), marks the first 
instance of a majority of the Court adopting heightened scrutiny in a non-First Amend­
ment case. It involved a compulsory sterilization law that the Court invalidated on a 
combination of due process and equal protection grounds. 
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democracy in America. The preferred position cases decided by the Su­
preme Court, beginning in 1937, reveal intuitions by several Justices, 
with Brandeis, that First Amendment rights were in a different category 
from other constitutional liberties and deserved greater constitutional 
protection than police power analysis afforded them. Those Justices in­
tuitively concluded that the reason for this enhanced protection for First 
Amendment rights lay not only in the close connections between free 
speech and democratic theory, but in the enhanced significance of dem­
ocratic theory itself as a defining aspirational feature of American 
civilization. 
B. The Preferred Position Cases: Intuitions About Cognitive Freedom 
and Democracy 
By the late 1930s the Court's First Amendment decisions showed 
signs of abandoning the legacy of police power liberty analysis, which 
the Court also had begun to modify significantly in economic liberty 
cases,91 and of reaching more speech-protective results.92 The question 
remained, however, as to why the now enlightened posture of judicial 
deference to reasonable legislative restrictions on economic activity 
should not also apply to restrictions on speech. If bifurcated review was 
to take place, on what basis could it be justified? 
The preferred position interlude in the twentieth-century intellec­
tual history of free speech in America consisted of efforts by several 
Justices to offer versions of the idea that First Amendment rights occu­
pied a special constitutional and cultural place in America because of 
their intimate connection to the idea of democracy. As a doctrinal de­
velopment, the preferred position interlude was cryptic and abortive. 
Between 1937 and the early 1950s various Justices on the Court de­
clared openly or implied that First Amendment rights occupied a pre­
ferred position. Their scattered remarks, although invoked by majority 
opinions in subsequent cases, neither clarified the precise doctrinal 
91 .  Compare West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379 with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400. 
92. In a series of cases between Whitney in 1927 and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 
242 (1937), the Court began to reach more speech-protective results and to supplant its 
bad tendency test in subversive advocacy contexts with a clear and present danger test. 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), continued to employ police power analysis and 
the bad tendency formula. But De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Herndon 
invalidated convictions under criminal-syndicalist statutes under circumstances where a 
bad tendency analysis would have sustained them. Meanwhile Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359 (1931), and Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), repre­
sented the first two instances in which the Court had openly invalidated a state statute 
on First Amendment grounds. 
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meaning of "preferred position" nor provided any extended justifica­
tion for why freedom of speech, religion, and assembly should be given 
preferred status. Eventually the Court implicitly abandoned the phrase 
"preferred position" altogether and explored other interpretive tech­
niques for carving out a high degree of protection for speech. 
But the episode, coming at the time it did, aptly illustrated the 
search for a bifurcated standard of constitutional review that lay at the 
heart of the Court's jurisprudential enterprise by the late 1930s. The 
preferred position sequence of cases represented an attempt by the 
Court to enshrine the modernist premise of cognitive freedom and to as­
sociate that premise with a powerfully evocative theme that surfaced for 
Americans in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century -
the theme of America as a democratic society. Beginning in the 1 930s 
and stretching through the years of the Second World War, the idea of 
America as a democracy dramatically expanded its cultural meaning, 
signifying not only a society based on freedom, but a society opposed 
to tyranny and arbitrariness; an antitotalitarian society that represented 
the world's last best hope for rationality and truth.93 
Free speech, in the preferred position episode, became democratic 
speech. It became closely associated with the intertwined ideas of crea­
tive self-fulfillment (freedom to express oneself) and equality (freedom 
from discrimination or oppression.) Those ideas were taken to be at the 
foundation of America as a democratic society. Free democratic speech 
in modernist parlance signified the power of the human actor, liberated 
from the dominance of external forces, free to determine his or her indi­
vidual destiny, required only to respect the freedoms of others. 
Modernist conceptions of freedom suggested that free democratic 
speech was unlike the other liberties in orthodox nineteenth-century ju-
93. Wiebe argues that in this period "the state," personified by the decisions of 
expert policymakers, decisively replaced "the People" as "democracy's last resort." 
See WIEBE, supra note 15, at 202. He also suggests that the elitist and individualistic 
emphasis of democratic theory continued in this period. These developments, taken to­
gether, facilitated the role of institutions of the national government, including the Su­
preme Court, in fashioning "democratic rights" for individual citizens. See id. at 220, 
225-26. 
I agree that the period from the early 1930s through the Second World War was 
one in which the Justices on the Court increasingly came to regard themselves as guard­
ians, and arguably creators, of free speech rights. Assumptions that democratic theory 
was implemented best by elites, and realized most effectively through the expansion of 
individual rather than collective rights, might have contributed to that development. But 
I think a more obvious motivation for Justices to forge an explicit link between free 
speech and democracy in the 1930s and 1940s rested in their awareness that in many 
other nations the expansion of state power was being associated with totalitarian re­
gimes that repressed speech. American "democracy" for them had powerfully antitotal­
itarian overtones. 
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risprudence. Such liberties had come to be associated with the undemo­
cratic economic excesses that had rewarded the rich at the expense of 
the poor and caused the Depression. The free speech ideal did not pro­
tect rights associated with material possessions but instead shielded 
rights embodied in the ideal of democracy. 
The sequence of preferred position cases started in a decision in 
which the phrase itself was not employed, but in which the theme of 
democratic speech surfaced. In Palko v. Connecticut,94 decided a year 
before the Carolene Products footnote, Justice Cardozo, for the Court, 
defined free speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom." "Liberty" in America, he con­
cluded, "has been enlarged . . .  to include liberty of the mind as well as 
liberty of action. "95 It is not clear by those remarks whether Cardozo 
meant to suggest that free speech rights, by being a "matrix" of other 
rights, were preferred over all other constitutional guarantees. But Palko 
was a case in which he searched for Bill of Rights freedoms that were 
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," so that "neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. "96 " [F]reedom of 
thought[] and speech" was first on his list.97 
Between Palko and the close of the Second World War the Court's 
free speech cases regularly involved challenges to state and municipal 
regulations by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. Many Witness 
sects believed that the Old Testament's First Commandment, forbidding 
the worshipping of any graven image, prevented them from participat­
ing in flag-salute ceremonies. They were thus the petitioners in one of 
the Court's most celebrated sequence of decisions, Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis98 and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar­
nette,99 in which the Justices reversed themselves on the constitutional­
ity of compulsory flag-salute laws, and overruled an opinion that had 
been rendered only three years previously and had engendered only one 
dissent. The flag-salute cases also can be shown to have been the basis 
for an eventual critique of the preferred position rationale by Justice Fe­
lix Frankfurter, who initially had identified himself with that rationale. 
94. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
95. Palko, 302 U.S. at 327 (citing Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAR.v. L. REv. 431 (1926)). The Court unanimously and 
without elaboration decided to incorporate the First Amendment against the states in 
Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
96. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26. 
97. 302 U.S. at 326. 
98. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Vrrginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar­
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
99. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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As early as 1939 Jehovah's Witnesses cases began to invoke judi­
cial declarations that speech rights should be given special solicitude. In 
Schneider v. Irvington Justice Roberts, for each member of the Court 
save McReynolds, conceptualized an antilittering ordinance directed 
against the distribution of Witness literature as pitting the "duty" of 
municipalities "to keep their communities' streets open and available 
for movement of people and property" against "the guarantee of free­
dom of speech or of the press." 100 In such cases the judicial task was 
"to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the 
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of 
the rights."101 Roberts made it clear what would weigh most heavily in 
the balancing: 
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the 
press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. . . . 
. . .  [L]egislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public 
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activ­
ities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the existence of 
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. 102 
Not only were First Amendment freedoms indispensable and fundamen­
tal, they had been linked explicitly to the ideal of democracy. 
A year after Schneider the first of the flag-salute cases was handed 
down, and the idea of democratic speech greatly expanded in cultural 
significance and revealed itself as containing some internal ambiguities. 
Both Frankfurter's majority opinion, sustaining the constitutionality of a 
Pennsylvania school district's practice of opening each day in its public 
schools with a mandatory ceremony paying homage to the American 
flag, and Stone's dissent, finding the practice a violation of the religious 
freedom of Jehovah's Witnesses families who objected to the practice, 
attempted to justify their positions through invocations of the indispen­
sable connection between freedom and democracy. Frankfurter asserted 
that "personal freedom is best maintained - so long as the remedial 
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed -
when it is . . . not enforced against popular policy by the coercion of 
adjudicated law."103 Stone countered that: 
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the people 
that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs. It is also an ex­
pression of faith and a command that freedom of mind and spirit must be 
100. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). 
101. 308 U.S. at 161. 
102. 308 U.S. at 161. 
103. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (footnote omitted). 
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preserved, which government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice 
and moderation without which no free government can exist. 104 
The Frankfurter-Stone exchange suggested that the ideal of democ­
racy could be translated into support for majoritarian, popular policies 
restricting speech as well as support for an individual's speech rights as 
the embodiment of freedom. As the Court developed those alternative 
conceptions of speech and democracy, it continued to review Jehovah's 
Witnesses cases, many involving municipal regulations on the distribu­
tion of leaflets.105 But the stakes involved in carving out special judicial 
protection for speech, at least within the Court, had been elevated. 
In the 1942 case of Jones v. Opelika, a 5-4 majority of the Court 
upheld municipal license fees directed against Witness pamphlets by 
characterizing the distributions as commercial transactions, and thus not 
implicating speech rights, and the fees as reasonable restraints on eco­
nomic activity. In his dissent Stone was not content simply to challenge 
the majority's characterizations of the municipal regulations. He an­
nounced that: 
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe 
them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the 
Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position. 
Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege 
is sought out for attack. They extend . . . to every form of taxation 
which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capa­
ble of being used to control or suppress it. 106 
Stone's dissent in Opelika made it clear that the "speech dimen­
sions" of the leaflets were what conveyed special protection on those 
who distributed them. By "preferred position" he meant that "every 
form of taxation" and other economic regulation that could be seen as 
infringing First Amendment rights would receive heightened judicial 
scrutiny. When one combines this categorization of preferred position 
rights with the original rationale for giving those rights special attention 
- their indispensable connection to the maintenance of democratic 
principles - it became clear that Stone was suggesting that speech 
104. 310 U.S. at 606-07 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
105. Between 1938 and 1946 the Court considered six such cases. See Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Murdock 
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (deciding 
a conglomerate of several comparable cases); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 
(1939); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Of these cases all but Lovell pro­
duced rhetoric identifying First Amendment rights as occupying a "preferred position." 
See infra text accompanying notes 106-12. 
106. Opelika, 316 U.S. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
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rights reinforced democracy in a way that economic rights did not. This 
suggestion expanded the cultura1 significance of democracy in America 
during a period of tota1itarian cha1lenges and made speech rights the ex­
emplar for bifurcated review in a post-Lochner constitutiona1 universe. 
This reading of Stone's dissent in Opelika is supported by an unu­
sua1 memorandum issued in the case by Justices Murphy, Black, and 
Douglas, all of whom had joined Stone's dissent. In that memorandum 
the three Justices stated that " [t]he opinion of the Court sanctions a de­
vice which in our opinion suppresses or tends to suppress the free exer­
cise of a religion practiced by a minority group." 107 They then an­
nounced that they had changed their mind about the Court's decision in 
Gobitis, which they had each joined (this despite the fact that Opelika 
had nothing to do with compulsory flag sa1utes). The reason they gave 
for changing their minds about the constitutiona1 status of religious­
based challenges to compulsory flag sa1ute laws was that "our demo­
cratic form of government, functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, 
has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of 
minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those views be." 108 
A personnel change on the Court provided additiona1 momentum 
to the theory that free speech rights should occupy a preferred position 
in a democracy. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,109 another Jehovah's Wit­
nesses license case handed down a little over a year later, vacated Ope­
lika and inva1idated all municipa1ly imposed "flat taxes" on the distri­
bution of religious literature.1 10 Douglas, for the majority in Murdock, 
declared that " [f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of relig­
ion are in a preferred position." 1 1 1  The context of his statement made it 
clear that he meant "preferred" to refer to a distinction between speech 
and commercia1 activity. "A license tax," he argued, "certainly does 
not acquire constitutiona1 va1idity because it classifies the privileges 
107. 316 U.S. at 623 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
108. 316 U.S. at 624 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). This allegedly left Roberts, Reed, 
Byrnes, and Jackson as continuing to adhere to Frankfurter's Gobitis opinion, but 
Byrnes and Jackson had not been on the Court for Gobitis, so Frankfurter hardly could 
regard them as firm adherents. 
109. 319 U.S. 105 (1942). Frankfurter protested against the Court's grant of certio­
rari in Murdock, which was virtually on all fours with Jones v. Opelika. See H.N. 
HmscH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 166 (1981). 
1 10. The majority in Murdock consisted of the four dissenters in Opelika plus 
newly appointed Justice Wiley Rutledge, who had replaced James Byrnes in the 1942 
Term. The remaining members of the majority in Opelika, Frankfurter, Roberts, Reed, 
and Jackson, three of whom had joined the majority opinion in Gobitis, dissented. 
1 1 1 .  Murdock, 319 U.S. at 1 15. 
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protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchan­
dise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike." 1 12 
Thus by 1943 Jehovah's Witnesses cases had given the Court an 
opportunity to formulate a distinction reminiscent of that made by 
Chafee: religious speech was specially protected, but commercial activ­
ity, including speech proposing a commercial transaction, was not.1 13 
The Court now returned to the issue of compulsory flag salutes, as the 
national counsel for the Witnesses challenged a policy imposed by the 
West Virginia Board of Education on all state public schools.114 After 
conference Stone knew that he had a clear majority to overrule Gobi­
tis115 and assigned the opinion to Jackson. Frankfurter was comparably 
aware that his position, which once had commanded the votes of eight 
Justices, now, three years later, commanded the votes of only three. As 
the opinions in the second flag salute case unfolded, it was apparent 
that two themes were on the Justices' minds: the "indispensable" con­
nection between free speech and democratic theory and the jurispruden­
tial implications of conferring a preferred position on speech rights. 
Jackson's opinion for the Court, after noting that " [t]hose who be­
gin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating 
dissenters," announced that "the First Amendment . . .  was designed to 
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings. . . .  We set up govern-
1 12. 319 U.S. at 1 15. 
1 13. The Court specifically had excluded commercial speech from First Amend­
ment protection in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
One could even suggest that Jehovah's Witnesses cases had stimulated the Court to 
make even more fundamental distinctions about speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamp­
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), Justice Murphy, for a unanimous Court, attempted to define 
the content of constitutionally protected free speech rights. He excluded from First 
Amendment protection 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . .  These include 
the lewd and the obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting 
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace . . . .  [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter­
est in order and morality. 
315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnote omitted). The petitioner in Chaplinsky was a Jehovah's 
Witness distributing sect literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire when he 
was accused of calling a city marshal " 'a God damned racketeer' " and a " 'damned 
Fascist' " 315 U.S. at 569. 
1 14. See West Vrrginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
1 15. The Gobitis majority, in addition to Frankfurter, had consisted of Chief Jus­
tice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy. 
Black, Douglas, and Murphy had signaled their desertion in Opelika, Hughes's and Mc­
Reynolds's seats were now occupied by Stone himself and Rutledge, and Robert Jack­
son had succeeded to Stone's seat 
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ment by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in 
power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent." 1 16 Having identi­
fied the First Amendment as embodying an antitotalitarian ethos, he 
then turned to the implications of treating the Constitution as withdraw­
ing "certain subjects," in which "fundamental rights" such as "free 
speech" and "freedom of worship" were implicated, "from the vicissi­
tudes of political controversy." 1 17 He listed among "fundamental" 
rights "liberty" and "property."1 18 Did this mean that bifurcated review 
was unintelligible, or that Lochner was revived? 
Jackson made it clear that the preferred position experiment would 
continue: 
[I]t is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles 
of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own 
sake. . . . Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears 
when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right 
of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so 
far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all the restric­
tions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But 
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not 
be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction 
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State 
may lawfully prevent.119 
Jackson's doctrinal conclusion was unmistakable: when First Amend­
ment rights were involved, the rational basis standard for evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislation now would have to yield to a version of 
Holmes' and Brandeis' clear and present danger test. 
Perhaps stung by the invocation of Holmes and Brandeis against 
his majority opinion in Gobitis, Frankfurter's dissent immediately took 
up the question of whether a preferred position for speech rights was 
necessary once one concluded that free speech bore an "indispensable" 
connection to democratic theory. His answer was that placing speech 
rights in a preferred position was not only unnecessary, but dangerous: 
The Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with 
one phase of "liberty" than with another . . . .  Judicial self-restraint is 
equally necessary whenever an exercise of political or legislative power 
is challenged. . . . Our power does not vary according to the particular 
provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked. The right not to have 
property taken without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judi-
1 16. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
1 17. 319 U.S. at 638. 
1 18. See 319 U.S. at 638. 
1 19. 319 U.S. at 639. 
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cial power is concerned, the same constitutional dignity as . • .  freedom 
of the press or freedom of speech or religious freedom.120 
Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette was part of an intense and ulti­
mately painful flirtation he had undertaken in the 1930s and 1940s with 
the preferred position experiment and bifurcated review. In 1938, after 
reading Stone's Carolene Products footnote, Frankfurter wrote Stone 
that he had just finished a series of lectures on Holmes in which he 
"tried to reconcile [Holmes's] latitudinarian attitude toward constitu­
tionality in cases other than civil liberties . . . with his attitude in civil 
liberties cases" ;  Frankfurter stated that he "was especially excited by 
[Stone's] note 4," which "is extremely suggestive and opens up new 
territory." 121 In his lectures on Holmes, Frankfurter had concluded that 
"the liberty of man to search for truth was of a different order than 
some economic dogma," and "therefore, Mr. Justice Holmes attributed 
very different legal significance to those liberties of the individual 
which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of a free soci­
ety from that which he attached to liberties which derived merely from 
shifting economic arrangements.''  122 
Two years later Frankfurter was on the Court writing the majority 
opinion in Gobitis, and he wrote Stone, after the latter had circulated a 
draft dissent, that "I am aware of the important distinction which you 
skillfully adumbrated in your footnote four . . . in the Carolene Prod­
ucts Co. case. I agree with that distinction; I regard it as basic." 123 And 
as late as 1941 he was prepared to declare, for the Court, that judges 
should approach efforts to restrict freedom of discussion in labor dis­
putes "with a jealous eye," and to cite footnote four in Carolene Prod­
ucts for that proposition. 124 
But Frankfurter had also told Stone, in his Gobitis letter, about his 
"anxiety that, while we lean in the direction of the libertarian aspect, 
120. 319 U.S. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
121. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 27, 1938) (on file 
with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in MURPHY ET AL., 
supra note 83, at 491.  The letter provides additional evidence that the bifurcated review 
project, in inchoate form, had begun with the emergence of modernist free speech juris­
prudence after World War I. Frankfurter's reference to Holmes's non-"latitudinarian" 
attitude in "civil liberties" cases could only have meant free speech cases, since 
Holmes was deferential to legislatures in all other cases. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 
377-409. 
122. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 
75-76 (2d ed. 1961). 
123. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (May 27, 1940) (on file 
with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in HIRSCH, supra 
note 109, at 151. 
124. See American Fedn. of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941). 
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we do not exercise our judicial power unduly . . . . In other words, I 
want to avoid the mistake comparable to that made by those whom we 
criticized when dealing with the control of property." 125 And after being 
humiliated in the flag salute sequence, 126 he signaled that any inclina­
tion he had had to endorse the preferred position experiment had been 
withdrawn. Eventually, after Stone died in 1946, Frankfurter decided to 
mount an open attack on the preferred position rubric itself. 
The case was Kovacs v. Cooper,127 a 1949 decision in which a plu­
rality of the Court sustained a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance prohibit­
ing the use of sound trucks that issued "loud and raucous noises." In 
Kovacs, Justice Reed, for a plurality that included Justices Vmson and 
Burton, endorsed what he called "[t]he preferred position of freedom of 
speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all," 128 but found that the 
state interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of its citizens 
overrode the First Amendment claim.129 Frankfurter and Jackson con­
curred in the result in Kovacs, with Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Mur-
phy dissenting. 
· 
In his concurring opinion Frankfurter launched an attack on the 
preferred position rubric. He called " 'preferred position' " a "mischie­
vous phrase" that had "uncritically crept into some recent opinions of 
this Court."130 He then set forth a history of preferred position, includ­
ing not only cases in which the characterization was explicitly used, but 
cases in which he concluded that the Court was adhering to a bifurcated 
standard of review. The result of this historical exegesis, for Frank­
furter, was that "the claim that any legislation is presumptively uncon­
stitutional which touches the field of the First Amendment . . . has 
never commended itself to a majority of this Court." 131 He then con­
cluded with an extraordinary sentence: 
[I]n considering what interests are so fundamental as to be enshrined in 
the Due Process Clause, those liberties of the individual which history 
has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a 
closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking 
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting eco­
nomic arrangements.132 
125. Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone, supra note 123, at 151.  
126. For evidence that the flag salute cases were a pivotal episode in Frankfurter's 
tenure on the Supreme Court, see HIRSCH, supra note 109, at 176-77, 211 .  
127. 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (plurality opinion). 
128. 336 U.S. at 88 (plurality opinion). 
129. See 336 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion). 
130. 336 U.S. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
131. 336 U.S. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
132. 336 U.S. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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This was, of course, an almost verbatim paragraph of the characteriza­
tion of Holmes's jurisprudence that he had made in 1938, in the course 
of an argument that "the liberty of man to search for truth was of a dif­
ferent order than some economic dogma defined as a sacred right. " 133 
Frankfurter's tortured and ambivalent reaction to the preferred po­
sition rubric, and to the bifurcated review project itself, underscores 
once again the pivotal role of speech rights in launching that project. 
The passage quoted above from his Kovacs concurrence suggests that 
Frankfurter had internalized the central assumption of the preferred po­
sition cases, that speech rights could be distinguished from rights de­
rived "merely from shifting economic arrangements" because of their 
indispensable connection to an open, democratic society.134 In that pas­
sage Frankfurter signaled his tacit acceptance of the bifurcated review 
project while apparently protesting against it. Rutledge, dissenting in 
Kovacs, observed that Frankfurter's excursus had "demonstrate[d] the 
conclusion opposite to that which he draws, namely, that the First 
Amendment guaranties . . . occupy preferred position not only in the 
Bill of Rights but also in the repeated decisions of this Court." 135 
There is no direct evidence about the reaction of any of Frank­
furter's other colleagues to his attack on the preferred position concept 
in Kovacs, but the phrase "preferred position" virtually disappeared 
from the Court's free speech cases, showing up only once more in a 
throwaway line by Douglas in a 1953 case.136 The short life of the pre­
ferred position rubric, however, concealed its significance as an impor­
tant transition phase in the twentieth-century intellectual history of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Both Chafee and Brandeis had hinted, but not explicitly suggested, 
that the search for truth and self-governance rationales for the protec­
tion of speech were associated with the training of citizens to make in­
formed and intelligent decisions about questions of public concern. Al­
though their formulations can be read as seeking to channel the freedom 
to learn about and to discuss public issues along paths consistent with 
the constraints of rationalism and empiricism, they had not indicated 
that all of the central premises of modernist consciousness were re­
flected in democratic theory and a model of democratic politics. They 
had not, in other words, explicitly suggested that the speech being pro-
133. FRANKFURTER, supra note 122, at 75. 
134. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
135. 336 U.S. at 106 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
136. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
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tected by the First Amendment was speech furthering the ideals of a 
democracy. 
By openly identifying the basis of special constitutional protection 
for speech as the indispensable connection between free expression and 
democratic theory, and at the same time distinguishing between speech 
and liberties deriving from shifting economic arrangements, the pre­
ferred position cases sought both to link free speech with the idea of 
America as a democratic society and to disengage protection for eco­
nomic liberties from that idea. "Preferred position" meant a preference 
for First Amendment freedom as having a particularly close association 
with the model of democratic politics that had surfaced in modem 
American society. It also meant, implicitly, that the freedoms associated 
with an economic model of unregulated capitalism were less democratic 
and hence less preferred. Liberties derived from "shifting economic ar­
rangements" were taken to be less indispensable conditions of an 
"open" society. 
There were, as the flag salute cases suggested, some difficulties 
with grounding a preferred position for speech rights in the expanded 
meaning of America as a democratic society. These lay in the tension 
between democratic theory as bolstering freedom of expression and 
democratic theory as being embodied in majoritarian policymaking. If a 
justification for legislative regulation of economic activity was that leg­
islatures, being representative of the majority of citizens, were appropri­
ate institutions to make policies affecting the distribution of benefits in 
the economic marketplace, why were they not equally appropriate insti­
tutions to determine the forms of expression that a majority wanted to 
restrict as well as protect? Yet the very cases announcing that First 
Amendment rights were to be placed in a preferred position because of 
the close connection between free speech and the ideal of democracy 
were cases in which legislatures, on behalf of their majoritarian constit­
uency, had restricted speech. 
Thus it appeared that a further particularization of what types of 
speech were indispensable to a democratic society, and which were not, 
might be required. This was especially true if one were inclined to grant 
Chafee's premise that humans tended to react rationally to economic is­
sues but subjectively and irrationally to speech issues. Although a dem­
ocratic model of politics suggested that policymaking should be 
majoritarian, Chafee's premise suggested that majorities were likely to 
suppress, perhaps even oversuppress, provocative speech. How did one 
determine which speech was presumptively immune from suppression? 
The rhetorical basis of the preferred position cases suggested an answer. 
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that speech which itself could be said to be indispensable to the func­
tioning of democratic politics.137 
In a search for indispensable, democratic speech, neither the search 
for truth formulation nor its accompanying metaphor of a constantly ex­
panding marketplace of ideas seemed to provide much guidance. Let­
ting more speech into the market did not clarify which expressions a 
majority could and could not suppress consistent with the ideal of de­
mocracy. It was not particularly surprising, then, that the first significant 
contribution to twentieth-century free speech jurisprudence to appear af­
ter the preferred position interlude was one that attempted to disassoci­
ate protection for speech from the "marketplace of ideas" and at the 
same time to refine the meaning of "democratic," protected speech. 
IV. THE MEIKLEJOHN INTERPRETATION, "PuBLIC SPEECH," AND 
THE PROGRESSION TO ABSOLUTISM 
A. The Doctrinal and Cultural Setting 
While the preferred position formulation was being experimented 
with in free speech cases from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, an­
other doctrinal development took place in the area in which speech­
protective theories of the First Amendment had initially surfaced -
subversive advocacy. By the 1940s free speech cases were beginning to 
group themselves loosely in three distinct areas: nonsubversive cases 
with a labor setting, such as Thomas v. Collins;138 cases involving ef­
forts on the part of a religious minority to disseminate its views, such as 
the numerous cases in which Jehovah's Witnesses were plaintiffs; and a 
continuing line of subversive activity cases, such as Herndon v. 
Lowry139 and De Jonge v. Oregon, 140 which after the early 1940s were 
reviewed using the clear and present danger test. 
This last set of free speech cases came to be affected by the ideo­
logical confrontation between an expanded Soviet Union, with its asso­
ciated bloc of communist-dominated regimes in eastern Europe, and the 
United States and nations in western Europe whose governments were 
modeled on democratic rather than totalitarian theories of political or-
137. One could argue that at the very time that several justices on the Court were 
demonstrating an enthusiasm for the preferred position rubric, they also implicitly were 
exploring distinctions between "protected" and "unprotected" forms of speech in cases 
such as Chaplinsky, Valentine v. Chrestensen, and the Jehovah's Witnesses leafletting 
cases. In such cases an implicit hierarchy of "higher" and "lower value" expression 
appeared to be forming, although the Court did not characterize it as such. 
138. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
139. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
140. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
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ganization. Communist states replaced the defeated fascist regimes as 
the principal form of world government rejecting a democratic model of 
politics. 
Some of the aims of international communism, when identified 
with communists or communist sympathizers in America, arguably gave 
a potentially new meaning to "subversion" in subversive advocacy 
cases. Among the stated goals of international communism was the sys­
tematic delegitimation and destruction of "bourgeois" governments that 
oppressed the people. These goals, encapsulated in the phrase "over­
throw the government of the United States," were taken, given the im­
mediate past history of imperialist totalitarian regimes, as directly hos­
tile to America, and efforts were made to deny legal status to the 
American Communist Party as a threat to national security. The per­
ceived danger created by international communism also gave a revived 
meaning to provisions in the 1940 Smith Act, enacted by Congress after 
war had broken out in Europe, 141 which made it unlawful for any person 
"to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, ne­
cessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
government in the United States." 142 
The constitutional culmination of these developments was the Su­
preme Court's interpretation of the clear and present danger standard for 
evaluating subversive advocacy in the 1951 case of Dennis v. United 
States. 143 In Dennis, Chief Justice Vinson restated the standard as 
"whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justi­
fies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger," 144 
and applied it to sustain a conviction under the Smith Act against 
eleven leaders of the Communist Party of the United States for conspir­
ing to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government. There was no 
evidence in Dennis that the defendants actually had participated in any 
141. The Smith Act's formal title was the Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 
670 (1940) (repealed 1952). See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD w AR POLITI­
CAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (1977). 
142. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 2(a)(l), 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (repealed 
1952). 
143. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
144. 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Vinson 
was quoting Learned Hand's rephrasing of the clear and present danger standard in 
Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). Gerald Gunther has argued 
that although Hand's rephrased test "diluted the most speech-protective interpretations" 
of clear and present danger, Hand did not do so out of a desire to reduce the level of 
protection for "subversive" speech but because he had long been frustrated with the 
vagueness of the test. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE 
JUDGE 599-600 (1994). 
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acts of subversive activity or had advocated such acts. The Court sim­
ply took judicial notice of their collective organization, the ideological 
tenets of international communism, and the political pressure being 
placed on non-communist regimes in Western Europe in the aftermath 
of the Second World War.145 
B. The Meiklejohn Interpretation 
Three years before the Dennis decision Alexander Meiklejohn, 
then the President of Amherst College, had published a book, Free 
Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government. 146 In his preface 
Meiklejohn stated that the book was prompted by two concerns: his 
sense that the U.S. government was moving on a number of fronts to 
suppress "dangerous" speech,147 and his conviction that the Supreme 
Court's clear and present danger test for evaluating such efforts at sup­
pression was inadequate.148 
Meiklejohn's particularistic motivations for writing Free Speech 
were clear enough, but the strategy he employed in formulating his the­
oretical position suggested that he was reacting to a larger jurispruden­
tial concern. The "most general thesis" of his argument, he announced 
in his first chapter, "is . . .  that our civil liberties, in general, are not all 
of one kind. They are of two kinds which, though radically different in 
constitutional status, are easily confused . . . .  One of these is open to re­
striction by the government. The other is not open to such restric­
tion. " 149 As examples Meiklejohn offered the liberty "of religious or ir­
religious belief," which "the government is unqualifiedly forbidden to 
restrict," and "the liberty of an individual to own, and to use the in­
come from, his labor or his property," which was " a  limited one," 
"open to restriction by the government." 150 
145. See GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 601-02. 
146. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF­
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
147. Meiklejohn cited the FBI's gathering of the "opinions" of "hundreds of 
thousands of our people" in its files, the House Un-American Activities Committee's 
investigations, the Department of Justice's listing of allegedly "disloyal" organizations, 
an Executive Order directed at establishing tests for "loyalty," and an order issued by 
the Attorney General that would restrict the opportunities of certain classes of aliens "to 
engage in public discussion of public policy." See id. at x-xiii. 
148. Meiklejohn began his discussion of the clear and present danger test by as­
serting that it "annuls the most significant purpose of the First Amendment" and "de­
stroys the intellectual basis of our plan of self-government." Id. at 29. 
149. Id. at 1-2. 
150. Id. 
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Meiklejohn located the constitutional source of these two types of 
liberties in the juxtaposition of the First and Fifth Amendments. The 
First flatly prohibited the abridgement of freedom of speech. The Fifth 
prohibited the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Liberty 
in the Fifth Amendment had been construed by the Court to include 
speech, but it still could be limited so long as due process was ac­
corded. There were thus two classes of liberties in the Constitution, 
nonabridgable and abridgable liberties, and speech could be included in 
both. It was crucial to determine what sorts of speech belonged in each 
class.1s1 
For Meiklejohn the answer was obvious. Speech as a due process, 
abridgable liberty was correlated to rights such as life and property, pri­
vate rights. Speech in the First Amendment referred to public speech, 
the freedom of public discussion. Thus "[t]he constitutional status of a 
merchant advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the ad­
vantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a citizen who is 
planning for the general welfare." 152 The question in every case was 
whether the speech was public or private, unabridgable or abridgable.153 
Meiklejohn's theory of free speech was closely connected not only 
to the bifurcated review project but to the search to identify those forms 
of speech that were sufficiently connected to the democratic model of 
politics to be presumptively immune from majoritarian restrictions. Al­
though the point of departure for his theory was the perceived threat to 
speech he found in the Court's Cold War subversive advocacy cases, he 
had larger goals in mind. 
It is instructive that in Meiklejohn's discussion of the clear and 
present danger test for speech, which occupied most of his attention in 
Free Speech, his primary emphasis was on the inadequacy of the "mar­
ketplace" metaphor offered by Holmes in his Abrams dissent. In one 
passage Meiklejohn spelled out his objections to that metaphor: 
151. See id. at 37-39. 
152. Id. at 38-39. 
153. Meiklejohn was not a lawyer, and commentators with legal training have reg­
ularly attacked his effort to distinguish First Amendment speech rights from Fifth 
Amendment speech rights as confused and even incoherent. Chafee reviewed Free 
Speech and Its Relationship to Self-Government in 1949 and suggested that 
Meiklejohn's attempt to do constitutional exegesis was analogous to his attempt to 
break up a fight among students when he was a professor of philosophy at Brown Uni­
versity before becoming President of Amherst. The only thing Meiklejohn's intervention 
in the fight had accomplished, Chafee suggested, was the denting of Meiklejohn's hat. 
See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 891-92 (1949); see 
also LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 149-51 (1986). 
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We Americans . . .  have taken the "competition of the market" principle 
to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test our think­
ing, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of the "rulers 
of the nation." That testing is to be done, we believe, not by us, but by 
"the competition of the market." Each one of us, therefore, feels free to 
think as he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private inter­
ests. We think, not as members of the body politic . . .  but as farmers, as 
trade-union workers, as employers, as investors. . . . And our aim, as we 
debate in those capacities, is not that of finding the truth. . . . Our aim is 
to "make a case," to win a fight, to make our plea plausible, to keep the 
pressure on. And the intellectual degradation which that interpretation of 
truth-testing has brought upon the minds of our people is almost unbe­
lievable. Under its influence, there are no standards for determining the 
difference between the true and the false. The truth is what a man or an 
interest or a nation can get away with. That dependence on intellectual 
laissez-faire, more than any other single factor, has destroyed the founda­
tions of our national education . . . .1s4 
This argument, of course, flatly denied any connection between the 
marketplace of ideas and a search for truth. That "marketplace" was 
like other markets, where the truth was "what a man or an interest or a 
nation can get away with." This equation of marketplaces with intellec­
tual degradation was a general theme of Free Speech. Meiklejohn pos­
ited distinctions between self-government and mere economic prefer­
ence, between civic responsibility and what one could "get away with," 
between a collective search for information about public issues and "in­
tellectual laissez-faire." 
It was as if Meiklejohn wanted to identify Holmes's marketplace 
metaphor with a whole catalog of bogeys associated with the collapse 
of an unregulated capitalist order. At one point Meiklejohn praised 
Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney as having "brought us far along the 
road toward . . .  the absolute freedom of public discussion," and having 
"den[ied] at its very roots the [clear and present danger] principle 
which had been formulated by Mr. Holmes" 155 in the unfortunate mar­
ketplace metaphor. He neglected to mention that Holmes had joined 
Brandeis's Whitney opinion, or that Brandeis continued to insist that the 
clear and present danger test should govern subversive advocacy cases. 
Only by understanding the intellectual context in which Free 
Speech appeared can one explain the subsequent influence of the 
"Meiklejohn Interpretation" of the First Amendment.156 For those of 
154. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 86-87. 
155. Id. at 54-55. 
156. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpre­
tation of the First Amendment, 19 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965) (acknowledging a connec-
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Meiklejohn's contemporaries who were committed to the bifurcated re­
view project, the clear and present danger test, despite its attractiveness 
as a device that gave judges maximum power and flexibility in speech 
cases, raised many of the problems of substantive judging associated 
with Lochner. 151 In addition, the preferred position characterization a1so 
appeared to be a comparably open invitation for unconstrained judicia1 
lawmaking, since those employing that characterization had given very 
little guidance as to which kinds of speech rights were to be preferred. 
The Meiklejohn interpretation, for a11 its ana1ytic deficiencies, rep­
resented an ingenious bifurcated review "solution." One attractive fea­
ture has already been noted: by abandoning clear and present danger for 
a more "absolutist" approach to protecting speech, but confining the 
category of protected speech to public speech, Meiklejohn's approach 
ostensibly avoided the opportunities for substantive judging inherent in 
clear and present danger. This feature was particularly responsive to the 
context of subversive advocacy cases in the aftermath of World War II. 
Meiklejohn's approach, for example, would have characterized the Den­
nis defendants' activity as public speech and protected it, at least to the 
point where the leaders of the Communist Party had not yet created an 
emergency by advocating immediate revolution.158 
A second attractive feature of Meiklejohn's approach was that it 
preserved much of the doctrinal framework of First Amendment juris­
prudence, including the intuitive attempts of the Court to create a hier­
archy of protected expressions. It was well-settled at the time of the ap­
pearance of Free Speech that the First Amendment did not apply to a 
variety of expressions, including commercia1 speech, 159 libel and slan­
der, 160 obscenity, 161 and unauthorized disclosure of private informa-
tion between Meiklejohn's theoretical rationale for the protection of free speech and 
certain Warren Court First Amendment decisions). 
157. Meiklejohn noted this in Free Speech, suggesting that Chafee's "search for 
truth" justification presupposed a judicial "balancing" of "[t]he interest in the public 
safety and the interest in the search for truth." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 64. In 
Meiklejohn's view balancing was appropriate only when a private need in individuals to 
speak was balanced against the public safety. Such a balancing was permissible under 
Fifth Amendment methodology, but that was reserved for private speech. The First 
Amendment, according to Meiklejohn, was "not saying that any man may talk when­
ever and wherever he chooses"; it was "not dealing with that private issue." It was 
saying that "as interests, the integrity of public discussion and the care for the public 
safety are identical." In public speech cases under the First Amendment, there was no 
need for judicial balancing. Public speech was fully protected. See id. at 65. 
158. See id. at 54-55. 
159. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
160. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
161. See 315 U.S. at 568. 
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tion.162 By describing each of these expressions as private speech, 
Meiklejohn avoided the intrusion of the First Amendment into a number 
of established common law doctrines. Moreover, an intuitive distinction 
between public and private expression already existed in free speech 
cases, as illustrated by the Court's treatment of commercial speech and 
its characterization of the solicitation efforts of Jehovah's Witnesses as 
noncommercial. Meiklejohn's tacit relegation of private expressions to a 
lower-value category of speech resonated with the views of those who 
were concerned with maintaining legislative control over economic or 
commercial activities in the post-Lochner era. 
Meiklejohn's approach also promised to clarify the meaning of the 
democratic speech singled out for protection in the preferred position 
cases. He explicitly associated public speech with the processes of edu­
cation and responsible citizenship in a democracy. The metaphoric con­
struct that he employed to introduce his theory of free speech was not 
the marketplace of ideas but the New England town meeting: a public 
forum in which all citizens participated and spoke freely about civic af­
fairs. As Meiklejohn described it: 
In the town meeting the people of a community assemble to discuss 
and to act upon matters of public interest - roads, schools, poorhouses, 
health, external defense, and the like. Every man is free to come. They 
meet as political equals. Each has a right and duty to think his own 
thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the arguments of others. The 
basic principle is that the freedom of speech shall be unabridged. . . . 
. . .  As the self-governing community seeks, by the method of vot­
ing, to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its indi­
vidual citizens. If they fail, it fails. That is why freedom of discussion for 
those minds may not be abridged.163 
In Meiklejohn's characterization, the search for truth formulation was 
stripped of its marketplace dimensions. In his portrait of the town meet­
ing no private or commercial issues corrupted the discussion: only pub­
lic matters such as roads, schools, poorhouses, and public health were 
on the agenda. The speech that he sought to protect was that associated 
with the quintessentially public and democratic act of voting on non­
commercial community issues. 
Finally, Meiklejohn's interpretation offered a way out of the appar­
ent dilemma between protection for speech rights and a commitment to 
the principle of majority rule in a democracy. One could argue that if 
the central purpose of speech was to foster individual citizen participa-
162. See Barber v. Time Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). 
163. MEIKLEJoHN, supra note 146, at 22-25. 
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tion in a democracy, an equation of majoritarian policies with the col­
lective will of the democratic citizenry was dependent on that un­
restricted participation. Otherwise a majority was not truly 
representative and its decisions not truly democratic. Majoritarian deci­
sions restricting speech rights were thus open to the charge that they 
sought to block the very channels of citizen participation that justified 
majority rule. 
But for all the apparent ingenuity of Meiklejohn's approach, it ap­
peared to contain a significant internal tension. If protection for free 
speech was so vital and necessary a task in American society, so indis­
pensable a condition of America as a democracy, it would appear that 
free speech itself was an important cultural phenomenon, something to 
be cherished. Moreover, if the central importance of speech in facilitat­
ing the democratic political process meant that the political speech of 
individuals could not be restricted without threatening the integrity of 
that process, then in an important sense individual speech rights 
trumped majoritarian efforts to restrict them. Why, then, had 
Meiklejohn offered so limited a definition of protected speech? One 
might have surmised from his elevation of the significance of individual 
speech rights in a democracy, and of free speech itself, that democratic 
theory required a wide latitude for individuals to speak freely on all 
subjects. Yet Meiklejohn insisted that democratic theory only required a 
wide latitude for individuals to speak on public subjects. 
Thus in making a powerful argument that individual public speech, 
in a democratic society, trumps majoritarian efforts to restrict it, 
Meiklejohn implicitly was raising the possibility that the self-education 
of individual citizens might not invariably be confined to public expres­
sions. Speech that signified the desire of individual citizens to learn 
more about themselves and the world around them might have value in 
a democracy whether or not it appeared to be directed toward public is­
sues. The capacity of humans to effectively govern themselves might be 
a product of qualities, such as self-confidence or integrity, that were not 
easily labeled public or private. The two components of the self-govern­
ance rationale, "self" and "governance," bore a problematic connec­
tion to Meiklejohn's insistence on maintaining the distinction between 
public and private speech. 
C. Launching the Progression Toward Absolutism: The Reception of 
Meiklejohn in the 1950s and 1960s 
The initial reviews of Free Speech criticized Meiklejohn's reading 
of clear and present danger, his constitutional exegesis, and the level of 
protection for public speech he advocated. But comparatively few re-
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viewers even alluded to the linchpin of Meiklejohn's approach, his dis­
tinction between public and private speech.164 Meiklejohn's metaphors 
and examples made it clear that he had a strong intuitive sense about 
which sorts of expressions were public and which private, and that he 
did not anticipate a particularly large category of expressions that were 
to be treated as unabridgable. Most early reviewers found that intuition 
unremarkable. 
By the 1950s free speech cases had come to the Supreme Court in 
increased numbers, and several conceptual problems had surfaced. Al­
though the problems took different forms in different doctrinal areas of 
First Amendment coverage, ranging from subversive advocacy165 
through a variety of areas now assembled under the category "low 
value" speech,166 they can be treated as specific variants on a general 
puzzle raised by the Meiklejohn interpretation. 
That general puzzle can be stated as follows: If, on the one hand, 
speech freedom was at the very core of cultural self-definition in 
America, and if, on the other, one granted Meiklejohn's premise that 
such freedom was only implicated in public speech, should First 
Amendment balancing remain part of the methodology of free speech 
jurisprudence? Or, alternatively, should an enhanced version of the cat­
egorist methodology suggested by Brandeis in Whitney, premised on a 
stark separation between "public" and "private" speech, replace the 
social interest balancing proposed by Chafee and operationalized in the 
164. A sampling of legal periodicals for the 1948-1949 academic year yielded nine 
reviews. See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Book Review, 36 CAL. L. R.Ev. 667 (1948); 
Chafee, supra note 153; Osmond K. Fraenkel, Book Review, 14 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PR.OBS. 167 (1949); John P. Frank, Book Review, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 405 (1949); Ir­
ving M. Gruber, Book Review, 8 LAW. GUILD R.Ev. 508 (1948); Arthur Garfield Hays, 
Book Review, 97 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 751 (1949); Charles B. Nutting, Book Review, 10 U. 
Prrr. L. R.Ev. 254 (1948); Eve Thomas, Book Review, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 66 (1948); Book 
Note, 47 MICH. L. R.Ev. 734 (1949). Of those only Chafee, Thomas, and Frank men­
tioned Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private speech. See Chafee, supra 
note 153, at 899-900; Frank, supra, at 41 1;  Thomas, supra, at 67. Chafee's criticism 
was the most extensive and telling. He called Meiklejohn's "supposed boundary be­
tween public speech and private speech" the "most serious weakness in [his] argu­
ment." Chafee, supra note 153, at 899. He wondered in what category would be in­
cluded books or plays, scholarship, and the arts. "The truth is," Chafee suggested, "that 
there are public aspects to practically every subject." Id. at 900. 
165. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
166. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (concerning commer­
cial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (concerning fighting 
words); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (precipitating a breach of the 
peace). 
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clear and present danger test? And, if so, could such a methodology es­
tablish any legitimacy? 
As the Warren Court began reconsidering speech cases in the 
1950s and 1960s, a categorist methodology, loosely termed First 
Amendment "absolutism," 167 surfaced as a respectable doctrinal per­
spective. The progression toward absolutism in free speech jurispru­
dence took two distinct stages. In the first stage, the Warren Court 
emerged as the most significant institutional champion of free speech to 
appear thus far in America. In subversive advocacy cases, the Court ob­
literated Dennis by fashioning a distinction between advocacy of unlaw­
ful action and advocacy of belief. 168 Only the former satisfied the clear 
and present danger test, so a mere showing that a defendant belonged to 
a political organization (the Communist Party) whose doctrines advo­
cated the overthrow of the Government was insufficient to make out a 
conviction under the Smith Act. Eventually the Court made the clear 
and present danger test significantly more speech-protective by permit­
ting convictions for subversive advocacy only "where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely 
to incite or produce such action." 169 
Meanwhile, as two Justices, Black and Douglas, declared them­
selves to be "absolutists," and several others, notably Brennan, Warren, 
167. "Absolutism" in First Amendment jurisprudence has, of course, never been 
the equivalent of unlimited protection for all speech, even all public speech. None of 
the free speech theorists surveyed in this article assumed that the First Amendment's 
categorical language prevents Congress from making any law that abridges speech in 
any conceivable fashion. The familiar example is a law making it a crime to advocate 
the immediate assassination of a public official. Absolutism in First Amendment juris­
prudence refers to a jurisprudential perspective that ostensibly rejects balancing in free 
speech cases for an analysis that treats some, or even all, forms of expression as pre­
sumptively protected, capable of being abridged only by the showing of a very strong 
interest on the part of the government in maintaining its own survival or that of its bed­
rock principles. 
168. See Yates, 354 U.S. at 324-27. In Scales, a 5-4 majority of the Court was sat­
isfied that "the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by directions as to the type 
of illegal action which must be taken when the time for revolution is reached," was suf­
ficient for a Smith Act conviction, but that the teaching alone was not. Scales, 367 U.S. 
at 234. 
169. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg 
the most inflammatory comment made by the speaker, and eventually broadcast on tele­
vision, went as follows: 
The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organiza­
tion. We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our 
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that 
there might have to be some revengeance taken. 
We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand 
strong. 
395 U.S. at 446 (quotation marks omitted). 
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and Marshall, adopted highly speech-protective positions, the Court be­
gan whittling away at the types of speech that Meiklejohn would, at 
least in 1948, have swept into his private, unprotected category.170 Nota­
ble among them were defamation171 and false light privacy,172 which 
came to be treated as presumptively unabridgable in some contexts. In 
some Warren Court decisions Meiklejohn was cited approvingly, 173 and 
his distinction between public and private speech was treated as a 
meaningful doctrinal rubric.174 Meiklejohn endorsed some of the devel­
opments: he was reported as saying, of the New York Times decision, 
"It is an occasion for dancing in the streets."175 
But then the progression toward First Amendment absolutism en­
tered a second stage, one in which the all-important distinction, for 
Meiklejohn, between public and private expressions began to break 
down. Eventually the Court would confer protection on a broad cate­
gory of speech - commercial speech - that Meiklejohn had assumed 
to be entirely outside the range of the First Amendment's coverage. In 
order to understand how this development came to occur, it is necessary 
to shift attention from Meiklejohn to the next influential twentieth­
century First Amendment theoretician, Thomas I. Emerson. 
V. EMERSON AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF MODERNIST FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Emerson's treatise, The System of Freedom of Expression, appeared 
in its fullest version in 1970.176 Emerson's work, although grounded in 
170. In Free Speech Meiklejohn had listed "libellous assertions" and "slander" as 
"fonns of speech" that "may be, and must be, forbidden and punished." MEIKLEJOHN, 
supra note 146, at 18. 
171. See New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
172. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
173. See Brennan, supra note 156 (underscoring the role of Meiklejohn's approach 
in the majority opinion in New York Times); Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Tunes 
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 
191, 208-09 (noting the majority opinion's debt to Meiklejohn and suggesting that the 
core of First Amendment protection was for "speech without which de�ocracy cannot 
function"). 
174. Notably in the area of defamation, where a progression of cases, stretching 
from New York Times to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749 (1985), the Supreme Court eventually tied a First Amendment privilege to the 
"public figure" status of the defendant or to the "public" or "private" nature of the 
communication. 
175. See Kalven, supra note 173, at 221 n.125. 
176. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) 
[hereinafter EMERSON, SYSTEM]. That work represented an expansion and further re­
finement of Emerson's 1966 book, THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THE­
ORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). 
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the contributions of both Chafee and Meiklejohn and sharing many of 
their theoretical premises, had the perhaps unintended effect of pointing 
free speech theory in quite different directions from what they had an­
ticipated. Emerson's interpretive theory of the First Amendment repre­
sents a culmination of the logic of modernist premises as applied to free 
speech issues. At the same time it can be seen as exposing the poten­
tially contradictory nature of those premises and as severing the as­
sumed connection between protection for free speech and democratic 
theory that previously had animated twentieth-century First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
As speech-protective jurisprudence gained additional momentum in 
the 1950s and 1960s, its original modernist premises appeared to have 
been modified. Rationalism and empiricism were compatible with 
Meiklejohn's emphasis on protecting public speech,m but those prem­
ises had been subsumed in the "town meeting" metaphor, which prima­
rily emphasized the connections between cognitive freedom and demo­
cratic theory. Speech-protective interpretations of the First Amendment 
increasingly emphasized two rationales: protection for speech furthered 
cognitive freedom and protection for speech underscored the democratic 
orientation of American society. 
Another significant figure in the development of free speech jurisprudence in the 
1960s and 1970s was Harry Kalven. See, e.g., Harry Kalven Jr., The Metaphysics of the 
Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1; Harry Kalven Jr., Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn 
and the Barenblatt Opinion, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 315 (1960); Kalven, supra note 173; 
Harry Kalven Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and 
Walker, 1967 SUP. Cr. REv. 267. For Kalven's most synthetic treatment of free speech 
issues, which appeared after his death, see HARRY KAI.VEN JR., A WORTHY TRADI­
TION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988), edited with an introduction by his 
son Jamie Kalven. 
Emerson's work has been singled out for treatment in this article because it repre­
sents a more extended synthesis of free speech issues than anything Kalven produced in 
the 1960s, and because Kalven's own synthesis, A Worthy Tradition, was incomplete at 
his death. The selection of Emerson is for heuristic purposes and should not be taken as 
a comparative comment on his and Kalven's stature. 
177. Consider the following passage from Free Speech: 
[I]n that method of political self-government [the town meeting], the point of ul­
timate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The 
final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions . . . .  The welfare of the 
community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They 
must know what they are voting about And this, in turn, requires that so far as 
time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and 
fairly presented at the meeting . . . •  
The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness . 
. . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth 
saying shall be said. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25. 
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The relationship between those rationales, which the preferred­
position advocates and Meiklejohn had taken as necessarily self-rein­
forcing, became perceived as ambiguous. Democratic theory could be 
seen as channeling protected speech into a public category of expres­
sion, as Meiklejohn urged, or democratic theory could be seen as giving 
impetus to self-expression itself, as a symbol of the high value democ­
racy placed on the diverse contributions of individual citizens. Liberta­
rian free speech theory thus could potentially expand the concept of 
freedom in First Amendment jurisprudence by disengaging freedom 
from Meiklejohn's conception of self-governance. Emerson was to 
struggle with the implications of that potential development. 
A. Emerson's Dilemmas 
1 .  The "Self-Fulfillment" Rationale For Protecting Speech 
The Meiklejohn interpretation became enlisted in the Warren 
Court's move toward First Amendment absolutism, but the very process 
of enlistment began to place pressure on Meiklejohn's self-governance 
formulation. Instead of fashioning numerous refinements of the bound­
ary between public and private speech, activist judges, comfortable with 
the ideological correctness of progressively expanding First Amendment 
freedoms in modem America, devoted their energy to widening 
Meiklejohn's category of protected expressions. Some of the new candi­
dates for protection represented the very sorts of expressions that 
Meiklejohn might well have relegated to the private sphere.178 These de­
velopments not only unsettled the Meiklejohnian boundary between 
unabridgable and abridgable speech, they appeared to make less com­
pelling Meiklejohn's insistence that protection for speech be coupled 
with self-governance in a democracy. Out of this swirl of activity came 
a new theoretical rationale for protecting speech, self-fulfillment, with 
which Emerson was prominently identified. 
Emerson was no less enlisted in the premises of modernist juris­
prudence than Chafee or Meiklejohn. In the first chapter of The System 
178. In Free Speech Meiklejohn, after insisting that "the First Amendment stands 
guard over the freedom of public speech but is indifferent to the rights of private 
speech," suggested that: 
It would be a fascinating and important task to follow those implications as they 
bear upon the rights to freedom which are claimed, for example, by lobbyists for 
special interests, by advertisers in press or radio, by picketing labor unions . . . 
by the distributors of handbills on city streets . . . and many others. In all these 
cases the crucial task is that of separating public and private claims. 
Id. at 99. First Amendment claims in each of these areas were considered by the Su­
preme Court in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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of Freedom of Expression, Emerson gave an overview of the "main 
premises" of a "system of freedom of expression in a democratic soci­
ety" that amounted to a textbook summary of modernist epistemol­
ogy.179 First was the affirmation of human cognitive capabilities. "The 
proper end of man," Emerson declared, "is the realization of his char­
acter and potentialities as a human being." To cut off expression was 
"to elevate society and the state to a despotic command over him and 
to place him under the arbitrary control of others." 180 
The freedom premise was followed by the empiricist constraint, 
embodied in search for truth language. Emerson stressed the centrality 
of expression as "an essential process for advancing knowledge and 
discovering truth." 181 The methodology of "open discussion" was lik­
ened to the methodology of scientific experimentation: " [a]n individual 
who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, con­
sider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and 
make full use of different minds." 182 The presentation of "unaccepted 
opinion[s] . . .  compel[s] a rethinking and retesting of the accepted 
opinion." Through open discussion "many of the most widely acknowl­
edged truths" had been shown "to be erroneous." 183 
Next came an assertion of the indispensable connection between 
free speech and the idea of democracy. Freedom of expression was "es­
sential to provide for participation in decision making by all members 
of society."184 Once one accepted the democratic philosophy "of the 
Declaration of Independence - that governments 'derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed' " - it followed that all the 
people "must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full free­
dom of expression . . .  in forming the common judgment."185 
Last was the rationalist constraint. Suppression of open discussion 
made "a rational judgment impossible, substituting force for reason."186 
The process of open discussion, in contrast, "promotes greater cohesion 
in a society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go 
against them if they have a part in the decision-making process." Since 
the process produced truth, it provided a foundation for rational deci-
179. See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 6. 
180. Id. 
181.  Id. 
182. Id. at 6-7. 
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sionmaking, thus facilitating social progress without "destroying . . .  
the balance between stability and change."187 
The order in which Emerson listed his premises represented a sub­
tle difference in emphasis from the formulations of Chafee and 
Meiklejohn. Chafee explicitly identified the social interest in the search 
for truth as a more important rationale than the individual interest in ex­
pression. His hierarchy of premises had been made more explicit by 
Meiklejohn, who reserved an absolute level of protection for that 
speech that was directly connected to "the voting of wise decisions" 
and suggested that such speech should not be seen as individual and 
private but as collective and public.188 
Emerson incorporated those rationales, but did not rank them first 
in his listing of the premises underlying protection for free speech. That 
place was reserved for the premise that "freedom of expression is es­
sential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment."189 For Emer­
son this individual interest in self-fulfillment outweighed in importance 
all social interests that might be advanced on behalf of protection for 
speech. Free speech was at bottom an affirmation of human "freedom" 
- an affirmation of the potential of humans as causal agents.190 
Emerson's singling out of freedom qua self-fulfillment as the pre­
dominant rationale for protecting speech represented an important wa­
tershed in the twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech juris­
prudence. This rearrangement opened the way not only for a continued 
uncoupling of the modernist freedom premise from the constraints of 
empiricism and rationalism, but also a potential uncoupling of freedom 
from the idea of democracy. 
In particular, Emerson's emphasis on self-fulfillment as the most 
significant value fostered by protection for expression intimated that 
protection for free speech rights might clash with outcomes reached 
through the process of democratic politics, or with an interest in the 
spread of truth, or with the maintenance of rationality, order, and stabil­
ity in public discourse. The logic of Emerson's emphasis suggested that 
an individual speaker's freedom primarily inhered not in his member­
ship as a citizen in a democratic community, or as a searcher after truth, 
187. Id. 
188. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25-27. 
189. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 6. 
190. See id. Emerson's conviction of the importance of self-fulfillment as a ratio­
nale for protecting free speech may have been enhanced by his involvement in efforts to 
protect the choice of married couples to receive information about birth control, which 
eventually led to the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). Progeny decisions on the part of individuals within a marriage 
amounted to an example of human cognitive freedom. 
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or as a contributor to rational decisionmaking, but as an autonomous 
human being.191 
Emerson's rearrangement of the premises underlying protection for 
free speech thus helps distinguish his contribution from those of his in­
fluential twentieth-century predecessors. That feature of Emerson's free 
speech jurisprudence, however, was not the only defining one. Equally 
important was Emerson's failure to grasp fully the implications of his 
rearrangement. Emerson, like Chafee and Meiklejohn, developed an ap­
proach to free speech that led to troublesome conceptual puzzles. But, 
as some examples will illustrate, Emerson barely addressed, let alone 
attempted to solve, those puzzles. 
2. "Hard" Free Speech Cases 
In the first chapter of The System of Freedom of Expression Emer­
son confronted the question of how one could justify an active role for 
the judiciary as a protector of free speech rights when judicial activism 
on behalf of economic "liberties" had become discredited. His response 
was characteristic of those who sought to promote bifurcated review: 
In considering the role of the judiciary in a system of freedom of expres­
sion it is essential to . . .  establish a fundamental distinction. We are not 
dealing here with any general function of our judicial institutions to fos­
ter the whole range of freedoms in a democratic society. Nor are we 
dealing with any broad power to supervise or review all major actions of 
the legislative and executive branches. We are concerned with the spe­
cific function of the judiciary in supporting a system of freedom of 
expression.192 
Emerson's conception of the judiciary "as a mediator between the gov­
ernment and the people," exercising the power of judicial review, was 
limited to free speech cases.193 He did not seek to revive aggressive ju­
dicial review as a general proposition. 
Emerson's emphasis on the self-fulfillment rationale, however, 
suggested that the idea of protection for free speech might be severable 
from the idea of promoting democratic theory. It suggested that some 
expressions, unrelated on their face to the democratic model of politics 
191. Another way to describe Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale was that it im­
plicitly began to incorporate emotive as well as cognitive expressions within a constitu­
tionally protected category. The inclusion of emotive speech within the First Amend­
ment's umbrella of protection arguably applied modernist aesthetics to free speech 
jurisprudence - freedom of taste in addition to freedom of thought - and stripped 
protected speech of the constraints of empiricism and rationalism. Emerson did not fully 
anticipate these developments. See infra text accompanying notes 225-42. 
192. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 13. 
193. See id. at 12. 
· 
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or even, arguably, to the expanded idea of democracy itself, nonetheless 
might come under the umbrella of the First Amendment. 
In addition to the problem of justifying bifurcated review itself, 
Emerson encountered at least four types of free speech cases in which 
his successive rationales for protecting speech seemed to contradict, 
rather than support, each other, with the self-fulfillment rationale threat­
ening to swallow up the others. The first of those was commercial 
speech. "The rule that communications in the 'commercial sector' of 
our society are outside the system of freedom of expression," Emerson 
noted, "has never been fully explained."194 He suggested that neither 
the courts nor commentators had made clear just what constituted the 
"commercial sector." Although that term seemed to signify a class of 
cases involving "the production and exchange of goods and services for 
profit," as distinguished from those involving "the production or ex­
change of ideas on political, religious, artistic, and similar matters," 
Emerson thought the distinction "very crude." 195 He also found that it 
had not been consistently followed in the Court's free speech cases: 
some decisions sharply distinguished between a "public right" of ex­
pression and "purely commercial advertising,"196 and others declared 
that the First Amendment rights of booksellers were unaffected by the 
fact "that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices." 197 
Nonetheless the "commercial sector" doctrine was still "well es­
tablished" at the time of the publication of The System of Freedom of 
Expression, 198 and Emerson sought to advance some justifications for it. 
He could only come up with two and presented them perfunctorily. One 
was that "it speaks well for a society that it accords greater freedom to 
the exchange of ideas than it gives to the exchange of material 
things."199 The other was that "society feels it necessary to give greater 
protection to its citizens in material affairs than in the affairs of the 
mind. "200 Both justifications were related to the intuitive distinctions 
between ideas and material entities that were made by proponents of the 
bifurcated review project. 
1 94. Id. at 414. 
195. Id. at 414-15. 
196. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Valentine v. Chresten­
sen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)). 
197. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)). 
198. See id. at 415 & n.1 .  
199. Id. at 415. 
200. Id. Emerson called this " [a] less worthy rationale." Id. It is not clear how the 
absence of protection for commercial speech would give "greater protection to . . .  citi­
zens in material affairs than in the-affairs of the mind.'' Id. 
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But despite those intuitions, Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale 
threatened the lower level of protection accorded speech in the commer­
cial sector. Who was to say that a creative slogan for a product was any 
more or less a realization of human potential than a novel about the ad­
vertising industry? Who was to say that expressive activities designed 
to generate money for their speakers were any less noble than other ex­
pressive activities? Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private 
speech had initially located all commercial expressions as outside the 
ambit of First Amendment protection, but Meiklejohn eventually con­
cluded, in a 1961 article, that literary and artistic expressions were ver­
sions of public speech.201 That conclusion blurred his initial distinction 
considerably, most noticeably in the cases of literary and artistic contri­
butions disseminated for profit. With the public status of certain com­
mercial expressions now recognized, Emerson's self-fulfillment ratio­
nale only weakened the commercial sector doctrine further. 
The second area was libel law. Emerson noted that, beginning with 
the New York Times case, the Supreme Court appeared to be organizing 
the constitutional law of libel around Meiklejohn's distinction between 
public and private speech. He then attacked the distinction, asserting 
that "there has never been a satisfactory definition of what is meant by 
'public speech.' "202 He pointed out that if the public speech realm was 
defined narrowly - as Meiklejohn originally had intended - it ex­
cluded "communication relating to art, literature, music, science and 
recreation."203 If used expansively, however, the term "would seem to 
have no limits," for "[i]t is hard to conceive of anything . . .  that can­
not be said to have some relation to social issues. "204 
Emerson clearly was troubled about the relationship of libel law to 
his general approach to First Amendment issues. It appeared that all of 
the rationales he advanced for protecting speech were served by al­
lowing full protection for false statements on public issues, even if they 
injured someone's reputation. Such statements were part of the process 
by which citizens informed themselves about public issues, learned the 
truth, and helped themselves make rational decisions. They also fur­
thered the value of self-fulfillment, because they were devices through 
which citizens expressed themselves on public matters.205 
201. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment ls an Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REv. 245, 257, 262-63. 
202. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 541. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. at 531-43. 
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Emerson balked, however, at expanding protection for libels whose 
only purpose seemed to be to "injur[e] . . .  individual feelings."206 Al­
though he had previously rejected Meiklejohn's public-private speech 
distinction as unworkable, he advanced another distinction, that between 
"expression" and "action."207 Communication having the sole effect of 
hurting another individual's feelings, he felt, was "the equivalent of 
'action,' similar to a physical assault. The harm done tends to be direct 
and instantaneous, and not remediable by longer-range social processes 
that can prevent subsequent damage. "208 Such communication was like 
speech that called for "imminent and dangerous" action: its major im­
pact was not as "expression" at all.209 
Emerson's strained distinction between expression and action in li­
bel cases helps reveal the tension between his successive rationales for 
protecting speech. Three of his four rationales had a distinctively public 
dimension. The search for truth and the promotion of rationality as an 
alternative to force were associated with the goal of enlightened public 
decisionmaking in a democracy, and the rationale of promoting com­
ment on matters of public concern was explicitly linked to the voting 
process. But the self-fulfillment rationale, especially as the concept of 
speech expanded to include the creative arts, could not be so easily as­
sociated with the public sphere of life. Emerson recognized that 
Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private speech had proved 
increasingly untenable. Yet he continued to retain an intuitive sense that 
merely private communications, bearing no apparent connection to 
democratic self-government, should not receive the same high level of 
First Amendment protection, even though they obviously furthered self­
fulfillment. 
Two other forms of expression presented Emerson with compara­
ble problems: campaign contributions or expenditures and lobbying. 
Those areas differed from ordinary commercial speech or defamation, 
however, in that the traditional purpose of legislative efforts to control 
corrupt practices or lobbying was that of purification of the electoral 
process so as to make it more democratic. Here Emerson confronted an 
obvious clash between self-fulfillment and his other rationales, because 
corrupt practices and lobbying legislation sought to further self­
government by restricting speech. 
206. See id. at 543. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. 
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In a series of cases going back to the nineteenth century, including 
the 1934 decision in Burroughs v. United States,210 the Court had sus­
tained federal and state legislation regulating corrupt practices in elec­
tion campaigns. Such legislation required disclosure of the sources of 
campaign funds, set limits on campaign contributions and expenditures, 
prohibited certain groups from contributing to campaigns, prohibited 
federal employees from making campaign contributions, and in one in­
stance prohibited comment on election issues on the day the election 
was scheduled.21 1  As late as the mid-1960s the constitutionality of most 
of this legislation still seemed taken for granted. 
Emerson wondered why comparatively little attention had been 
given to the free speech implications of corrupt practices legislation. "If 
a candidate in an election can be required to disclose his income and 
expenditures for expression," he asked, "why cannot all other persons 
be required to make similar disclosures in connection with other expres­
sion?"212 He also suggested that if the government could "equalize the 
amount of speech uttered in a campaign" by controlling the volume of 
campaign expenditures, why could it not "equalize the amount of 
speech uttered on any subject?"213 The Court's corrupt practices deci­
sions, he concluded, had "advanced no theory upon which to base an 
answer to these questions. "214 
There was in fact an intuition driving the decisions, although it had 
perhaps not reached the level of a theory. Corrupt practices legislation, 
even though it restricted speech, could be seen as fostering all of the ra­
tionales for protecting speech in a democracy except self-fulfillment. By 
preventing any one individual or group from dominating public debate 
about electoral issues, the legislation ostensibly promoted the search for 
truth, encouraged the formulation of rational policies, and fostered self­
government. That it did so at the expense of free expression was obvi­
ous, but the kind of expression being limited could be seen as under­
mining the democratic process. 
If Emerson recognized the above defense of corrupt practices leg­
islation, he did not weigh it very heavily. He proposed limiting such 
legislation to regulations on individual candidates in election cam-
210. 290 U.S. 534 (1934). A nineteenth-century decision exhibiting a similar view 
was Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). 
21 1 .  See Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 4, at 531, 541, 551-53 for additional 
cases. The last example was raised by an Alabama statute that the Court invalidated, as 
applied to a newspaper editorial that appeared on the day of a municipal election, in 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
212. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 639. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
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paigns. He did not think that most groups should be restricted in their 
contributions, or that noncandidates should be prevented from distribut­
ing anonymous campaign literature. To the extent he thought corrupt 
practices legislation useful, it was as a check against "the potential mo­
nopoly control over expression conferred upon the candidate. "215 He 
felt that "corporations could be controlled on the theory they were part 
of the commercial sector and thus outside the regular system of free­
dom of expression. "216 The contributions and expenditures of labor un­
ions, on the other hand, could not be controlled.217 
Emerson was equally doubtful about the constitutionality of legis­
lation regulating lobbying. He pointed to United States v. Harriss,218 in 
which the Court sustained the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 
which required detailed reports to Congress from any persons who had 
received contributions or who had expended money to influence Con­
gressional legislation. The Court had narrowed the reach of the statute 
to persons who had engaged in "direct communication" with members 
of Congress. That did not impress Emerson, who concluded that "lob­
bying legislation is difficult to reconcile with the principles of the First 
Amendment. "219 The primary purpose of lobbying legislation, he be­
lieved, was "to curtail bribery or expose the political motivations of the 
legislator to the electorate, interests that cannot constitutionally be ad­
vanced by curtailing expression. "220 
Here again Emerson confronted an issue in which restrictions on 
speech allegedly were designed to promote freedom of expression in a 
democracy by improving the search for truth of legislators and equaliz­
ing the weight of the views of all members of the electorate. But of 
course restrictions on lobbying, like restrictions on commercial speech 
or on campaign contributions, affected the self-fulfillment of particular 
members of the public in a direct way. The reason such restrictions had 
been tolerated - in some instances not even seen as raising First 
Amendment issues - was that as twentieth-century free speech juris­
prudence had developed in the shadow of the bifurcated review project, 
the self-fulfillment of lobbyists, political interest groups, or corporations 
had implicitly been ranked lower than that of, say, dissident political 
speakers. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 640. 
217. See id. at 639-40. 
218. 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
219. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 641-42. 
220. Id. at 642. 
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B. The Surfacing of Internal Contradictions in Free Speech 
Jurisprudence 
363 
With the appearance of Emerson's The System of Freedom of Ex­
pression, free speech jurisprudence began to exhibit some significant in­
ternal strains. Emerson did not act as if his emphasis on self-fulfillment 
had undermined the traditional twentieth-century rationales for protect­
ing speech. He listed them alongside self-fulfillment. But as the logic of 
protection for self-expression gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s 
and widened the category of constitutionally protected expressions, 
thereby placing pressure on Meiklejohn's distinction between public and 
private speech, the self-reinforcing nature of the modernist premises of 
cognitive freedom, empiricism, and rationality threatened to dissolve. 
An implicit assumption of the search for truth rationale, and, for 
that matter, of the Supreme Court's decision in the early 1940s to iden­
tify a category of "lower value" expressions that were not candidates 
for First Amendment protection, was that eventually Americans could 
agree as to what constituted true information, or rational policies, or, for 
that matter, coarse or immoral behavior. Excluding lewd or profane 
speech as playing "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, "221 or 
"epithets or personal abuse" as "not in any proper sense communica­
tion of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, "222 was 
consistent with this assumption. 
Meiklejohn appeared initially to acquiesce in a similar assumption, 
at least in the sense of not suggesting that his analysis required a recon­
sideration of lower value categories of speech. But as he, and the Court, 
began to give a wider scope to the category of public expressions in the 
1960s, sweeping into that category literature, the arts, and even libelous 
speech directed at public officials or matters of public concern, it ap­
peared that eventually some of the archetypal candidates for lower 
value categorization might be capable of being conceptualized as public 
speech. 
Two such candidates surfaced in the 1970s. In both instances the 
Supreme Court concluded that the expressions deserved First Amend­
ment protection.223 But when the justifications for protecting the expres­
sions are examined, there is little evidence that they were being pro­
tected primarily because of their public character, that is, because of 
221. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
222. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). 
223. Only one case produced an actual Supreme Court opinion; in the other the 
Court denied certiorari, letting stand a federal circuit court opinion conferring protection 
on the expression. 
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their contributions to the processes of self-governance. In both cases the 
courts that concluded that the expressions should be protected primarily 
emphasized their value as representations of the diverse viewpoints an­
ticipated by a society dedicated to the freedom of individual expression. 
The fact that the expressions were coarse, or highly provocative, or ar­
guably even false or irrational, as much emotive as cognitive, not only 
did not diminish their eligibility for First Amendment protection, it ar­
guably cemented that eligibility; the message in both cases was that free 
speech above all meant, as Holmes had once said, "freedom for the 
thought that we hate. "224 
The first case was Cohen v. California,225 in which the Supreme 
Court overturned the conviction of a young man for disturbing the 
peace by "offensive conduct." His offense was wearing a jacket in a 
municipal courthouse bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Justice 
Harlan, for the Court, found that the message on the jacket was 
"speech" rather than "conduct"; that it did not represent "fighting 
words"; and that it was not "obscene." It was merely "offensive" 
speech, which was protected by the First Amendment despite its alleg­
edly "annoying" and "distasteful" character. " [O]ne man's vulgarity,'' 
Harlan declared, "is another's lyric."226 
The second was Collin v. Smith,221 in which the National Socialist 
Party of America (NSPA) requested and was denied a permit to march, 
wearing Nazi-style uniforms, through the village of Skokie, Illinois, a 
Chicago suburb whose population included about 40,000 Jews, several 
thousand of whom were survivors of Nazi World War Il concentration 
camps.228 The denial was based on several village ordinances, the most 
salient one prohibiting the incitement of hatred based on race, national 
origin, or religion. Since that ordinance had not been narrowed to cover 
only face-to-face confrontations - "fighting words" - it was held un­
constitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
Neither Cohen nor the NSPA would have received First Amend­
ment protection under doctrinal formulations in existence from the 
World War I Espionage Act cases through at least the mid-1960s. Wear­
ing a jacket with a vulgar message was, alternatively, treated as fighting 
words or as conduct rather than speech when that distinction surfaced in 
224. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
225. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
226. 403 U.S. at 25. 
227. 578 F.2d 1 197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
228. See BOLLINGER, supra note 153, at 13, 24. 
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picketing cases after World War II.229 The message "Fuck the Draft" 
was lewd or profane, and thus "no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas" under Chaplinsky.230 NSPA's "message" in the Skokie case em­
ployed the use of epithets directed at personal abuse, which Cantwell 
had singled out as unprotected speech. The slogans exhibited by the 
marchers might have been treated as a form of group libeling of Jews, 
or even potentially as subversive advocacy.231 
The opinions in both Cohen and the Skokie case, however, ap­
peared to have started with an altered consciousness about the existence 
of empiricist and rationalist constraints on speech. Rather than assum­
ing, as earlier courts had, that the messages in Cohen and Collin were 
so patently juvenile or unsound that they played "no essential part in 
any exposition of ideas," courts in the 1970s assumed that such 
messages might be sought to be suppressed because they were "inher­
ently likely to provoke violent reaction."232 In Cohen Justice Harlan de­
scribed what he took to be the "constitutional backdrop" against which 
free speech cases should be made: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a soci­
ety as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to re­
move governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, put­
ting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands 
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately pro­
duce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief 
that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual 
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.233 
Although there are echoes of Meiklejohn in this excerpt, those ech­
oes appear in a passage whose unmistakable purpose is to center the fo­
cus of free speech cases on "individual dignity and choice." Although 
freedom of expression is identified with "a more capable citizenry" and 
a "more perfect polity," the American political system ultimately rests 
229. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229, 235-38 (1963). 
230. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
231. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding the constitution­
ality of group libel statutes). The assertions of Jewish inferiority that lay at the core of 
Nazi ideology could have been treated as "false statements of facts" about Jews. Simi­
larly, the Court's subversive advocacy decisions, from Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919) through Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), suggested that if 
the distribution of antiwar pamphlets during wartime or the exchange of ideas by lead­
ers of the American Communist Party during peacetime could be suppressed, a march 
by neo-Nazis through an American suburb might be as well. See the discussion of the 
Skokie case in BOLLINGER, supra note 153, at 31-33. 
232. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
233. 403 U.S. at 24. 
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on the free choices of the autonomous individual. The model of demo­
cratic politics did not "effectively empower a majority to silence dissi­
dents simply as a matter of personal predilections. "234 
With Cohen, the Skokie case, and other · developments in First 
Amendment jurisprudence that arguably represented even greater depar­
tures from Meiklejohn's original formulation of self-governance,235 
Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale had been expanded to create a per­
spective on First Amendment issues that could be seen as affirming 
emotive as well as cognitive freedom as the superordinate First Amend­
ment value ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric"), and arguably dis­
associating that freedom from empirical inquiry and rational 
policymaking. 
The relationship between self-governance and self-fulfillment in a 
society committed to democracy is complicated, and one could argue 
that the two rationales can be made complementary in a First Amend­
ment jurisprudence that gives the widest possible latitude for individual 
citizens to engage in public discourse on subjects that arguably have a 
bearing on the process by which citizens participate in public affairs.236 
But at some point such a jurisprudence requires some criteria for deter­
mining what are appropriately public subjects, unless freedom of indi­
vidual expression is invariably going to trump majoritarian efforts to re­
strict it. Meiklejohn, in formulating the concept of "public," 
unabridgable speech, was quite confident that such criteria could be 
found, and his criteria were closely connected to the implicit constraints 
of relevance and rationality that he found in town meeting discourse. 237 
Put another way, Meiklejohn was quite confident that the modernist 
premises undergirding special status for free speech in American society 
were self-reinforcing. 
But Cohen, the Skokie case, and the Court's decisions narrowing 
the definition of proscribable obscene expression either sanctioned a 
much broader, perhaps even boundless, conception of public discourse 
or suggested that in certain instances speech that bore no true or ra­
tional relationship to collective policymaking in a democracy nonethe-
234. 403 U.S. at 21. 
235. Consider the Warren Court's decisions in obscenity law, in which two Jus­
tices, Douglas and Black, declared that obscenity was "absolutely" protected by the 
First Amendment, and several others showed a tendency to invalidate most obscenity 
prosecutions. That line of cases culminated in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), 
in which the Court held that an individual could not be prosecuted under the First 
Amendment for watching even concededly "obscene" material in his home. 
236. See ROBERT c. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COM­
MUNITY, MANAGEMENT 270-72 (1995). 
237. Post develops this point effectively. See id. at 274-76. 
November 1996] First Amendment 367 
less should be protected. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court invalidated a 
conviction for possession of allegedly obscene films viewed solely in 
one's home, and declared that " [i]f the First Amendment means any­
thing, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or films he may watch. "238 
It is hard to see how the private viewing of an obscene film bears any 
meaningful connection to public discourse. It is easy to see, by contrast, 
how freedom to determine the sexual content of materials that one reads 
or views in one's home can be derived from the rationale of self­
fulfillment. 
Emerson might have anticipated that his emphasis on self-fulfill­
ment as a paramount First Amendment value could lead to decisions 
such as Cohen and the Skokie case; he had already noted, and ap­
plauded, the Court's libertarian posture toward subversive speech in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,239 and he had been a proponent of First Amend­
ment protection for most forms of obscene expression.240 But he hardly 
could have anticipated that the momentum on behalf of freedom in First 
Amendment cases, and the severing of the freedom premise from the 
empiricist and rationalist premises in First Amendment theory, would 
have threatened the bifurcated standard of constitutional review that he 
and his predecessors had sought to develop. 
Yet that was precisely what occurred as libertarian free speech the­
ory discovered new beneficiaries in the 1970s and 1980s. As the self­
fulfillment rationale gained momentum, it threatened to sever freedom 
of speech from democratic theory and from the empiricist and rational­
ist premises that had undergirded the marketplace of ideas and self­
govemance rationales. The implicit limits established on categories of 
protected speech by those rationales came under strain as self­
fulfillment took on a more openly pluralistic character. As more speak­
ers, and more types of speech, seemed candidates for First Amendment 
protection, an original basis for launching the bifurcated review project 
- that speech was a particularly special cultural activity in a demo­
cratic society - appeared more problematic. For if everyone's speech, 
in any form, is free from restriction by the state, it is hard to discern 
why the state, as personified by its democratic majorities, has an invest­
ment in speech in the first place. 
238. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
239. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 156-57, 
159-60. 
240. See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176 at 495-503. 
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VI. THE RETRENCHMENT OF FREE SPEECH THEORY: SUNSTEIN'S 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
We have seen that prior to the severance of freedom from demo­
cratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, the main source of 
doctrinal tension in free speech jurisprudence lay in the delineation of 
the boundaries of public (unabridgable) and private (abridgable) speech, 
a process that was central to Meiklejohn's approach. But with the eleva­
tion of the self-fulfillment rationale, and the potential severance of free­
dom from democratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, a dif­
ferent locus of tension surfaced. As the value of self-fulfillment became 
implicated in an increasing variety of expressive contexts, doctrinal 
puzzles began to emerge from cases that were seen as illustrating the 
potential opposition of the self-fulfillment rationale and democratic the­
ory itself. 
A. " Unexpected Beneficiary" Cases 
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present, the logic of 
the self-fulfillment rationale for protecting speech, with its emphasis on 
the cognitive and emotive capabilities of the individual, produced a se­
ries of First Amendment decisions in which new sorts of claimants 
found their expressions swept within the category of protected speech. 
Some of the claimants - such as commercial advertisers or contribu­
tors to political campaigns241 - were persons whose expressions had 
explicitly or implicitly received little First Amendment protection prior 
to the 1970s.242 Others - such as those who burned crosses on the 
241. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (commer­
cial speech); Vrrginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vrrginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (same); Federal Election Commn. v. National Conservative Politi­
cal Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (campaign contributions and expenditures); 
First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (same). 
242. Prior to the 1970s there was an absence of First Amendment challenges to 
corrupt practices legislation, such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18 
U.S.C. § 602 (1994), which required all political organizations to render a detailed ac­
counting of contributions received and expenditures made for the purpose of influencing 
the election of presidential electors or candidates in two or more states. The constitu­
tionality of that act was upheld in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), but 
only on the issue of whether Congress possessed sufficient power to regulate state elec­
tions. No First Amendment issues were raised in Burroughs, and Congress took for 
granted its power to place ceilings on the amount of contributions and expenditures by 
individuals, doing so in the Hatch Political Activity Act of 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1 147 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 18 U.S.C.). 
Commercial advertising and campaign expenditures involving corporations were 
treated as "part of the commercial sector" and "thus outside the regular system of free-
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property of neighbors as expressions of their racial animosity243 - had 
been treated as either engaging in lower value speech or not engaging 
in speech at all.244 
The emergence of unexpected First Amendment beneficiaries since 
the mid-1970s conventionally has been described in commentary as a 
surprising liberalization of free speech jurisprudence by a Court taken 
to be more conservative in its general outlook than the Warren Court of 
the 1960s.245 From the perspective of this article, such conventional po­
litical labels are misleading. The recent cases creating new beneficiaries 
of the free speech principle can be seen more fruitfully as examples of 
the theoretical fragmentation of twentieth-century free speech jurispru­
dence brought about by the severance of the concept of freedom from 
democratic theory. 
One way to approach the various expressions implicated in the 
new beneficiary cases is to consider them, simultaneously, as potential 
exemplars of cognitive or emotive freedom and as potential tests of an 
asserted inextricable connection between free speech and the ideal of 
democracy. Under this approach, one would ask which of the expres­
sions could be said to receive First Amendment protection because they 
manifest both freedom and democratic theory; and which, by contrast, 
could be said to threaten democratic theory or to have arisen in contexts 
dom of expression." EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 640; see Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
243. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (concerning cross 
burning as group defamation or hate speech). 
244. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), and Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), referred to "epithets or personal abuse" as 
"not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution," Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10, and as falling within "certain . . .  classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem," Chaplinsky, 3 15 U.S. at 571-72. See also Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (upholding a statute making it a crime to portray 
"depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, 
color, creed or religion, which . . .  exposes [those citizens] to contempt, derision or ob­
loquy"). The statute was enforced against the president of the White Circle League, 
who had distributed a pamphlet identifying "the negro" with "aggressions, rapes, rob­
beries, knives, guns, and marijuana," and with "the . . .  encroachment, harassment and 
invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods, and persons." 343 U.S. at 252. 
As late as Cohen the issue of whether "symbolic expressions" such as wearing 
clothes with messages or burning flags or crosses amounted to speech was still regarded 
as up for grabs: three of the four dissenting justices asserted that "Cohen's absurd and 
immature antic . . .  was mainly conduct and little speech" and thus completely unpro­
tected. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
245. An illustrative example of this line of commentary is Keith Werhan, The Lib­
eralization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REv. 51  
(1994). 
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where the goals of democratic theory and individual freedom appear 
incompatible. 
1 .  Commercial Speech 
If we consider the set of protected expressions in the unexpected 
beneficiary cases in this fashion, the recent severance of freedom from 
democratic theory in free speech jurisprudence becomes apparent. In 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun­
cil,246 the first case squarely holding247 that purely commercial expres­
sions were entitled to a measure of First Amendment protection, the 
Court suggested that "the free flow of commercial information" - in 
this instance about the prices of prescription drugs - was not only "in­
dispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise 
system," it was also essential "to the formation of intelligent opinions 
as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. "248 One set of 
commentators called this argument "a non sequitur" and maintained 
that "in terms of relevance to political decisionmaking, advertising is 
neither more nor less significant than a host of other market activities 
that legislatures concededly may regulate. "249 
That insight seems accurate. Virginia Pharmacy represented a situ­
ation, common enough in the years after 1940, in which a legislative 
majority had concluded that regulation of market activity was necessary 
to promote consumer welfare, whether or not individual consumers 
wanted the activity to be regulated. The Virginia legislature was con­
cerned that advertising of prescription drug prices might induce con­
sumers to trade off quality against price, with potentially adverse health 
effects. The Court, straining to demonstrate that the regulation affected 
"public decisionmaking in a democracy,"250 suggested that because in­
formation about the price of drugs might enhance the individual eco­
nomic choices of consumers, that information would necessarily also 
enhance the collective political choices of consumers who would then 
have an enhanced basis for evaluating policies directed toward deregu­
lation of the pharmaceutical industry.251 But one just as well could have 
246. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
247. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn. on Human Relations Commn., 
413 U.S. 376 (1973), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), suggested that Val­
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) was on shaky ground. 
248. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
249. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Eco­
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 ,  17-18 (1979). 
250. 425 U.S. at 765. 
251. See 425 U.S. at 765. 
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argued that by electing representatives who chose to regulate commer­
cial speech for the protection of consumers, individual citizens had al­
ready signaled their political choices. 
The fact was that a decision expanding protection for commercial 
speech bore only a remote nexus to the self-governance rationale. It 
was, rather, a product of a progression in Meiklejohnian logic that actu­
ally served to redirect speech-protective jurisprudence away from his 
central distinction between public and private speech. Mindful that a 
narrow definition of public speech would place in an unprotected cate­
gory most forms of literary and artistic expression, Meiklejohn, we have 
seen, expanded his conception of public speech to include nonobscene 
art and literature on the theory that exposure to such expressions edu­
cated the citizenry and thus enhanced the climate that nurtured demo­
cratic theory and self-governance.252 
The inclusion of artistic and literary expression in a protected cate­
gory of public expression may well have made conceptual and strategic 
sense to Meiklejohn and his supporters, but it helped elevate to pro­
tected status a variety of expressions engaged in for profit. Thus by the 
time Virginia Pharmacy appeared on the Court's docket, not only was it 
settled that books, magazines, and paintings did not forfeit First 
:Amendment protection because they were sold commercially, but paid 
political advertisements253 and other communications "dependen[t] . . .  
on the expenditure of money"254 also had been included within a pro­
tected category of speech. 
Although decisions expanding First Amendment protection for ar­
guably expressive activity that took place in a commercial setting took 
pains to suggest a connection between the activity and self­
governance,255 a passage in Virginia Pharmacy was more revealing of 
the principal rationale of the Court's commercial speech cases. In that 
passage the Court acknowledged that "the particular consumer's inter­
est in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if 
not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political de­
bate. "256 Protection for commercial speech harmonized with a view of 
First Amendment speakers as autonomous individuals seeking to make 
choices that reflected their utility preferences. As one commentator put 
it, " [i]f free speech was defended with the metaphor of the market, it 
252. See Meiklejohn, supra note 201, at 262-66. 
253. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). 
254. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16  (1976) (upholding First Amendment protec­
tion for campaign expenditures) 
255. See New York Tunes, 376 U.S. at 273-76; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 52-53. 
256. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. 
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was only a matter of time . . .  before the market was defended with the 
metaphor and substance of free speech. "257 
2. Political Campaigns and Expenditures 
In cases deriving a First Amendment right to make unlimited ex­
penditures, and limited contributions, to political campaigns,258 the 
Court confronted situations in which the legislative rationale for re­
stricting the amount of money that could be channeled into a political 
campaign was directly tied to democratic theory. Congress and the 
states assumed that unlimited campaign contributions or expenditures 
created the possibility of unequal access to the electoral process on the 
part of citizens. Money begat access, and access begat influence, poten­
tially undermining the egalitarian premises of participatory self­
government.259 
But even though it identified this rationale in the contribution­
expenditure cases, the Court concluded that it was insufficient, at least 
where expenditures were concerned, to withstand an individual's First 
Amendment claim to access to political candidates. Neither individuals, 
corporations, nor political organizations could be prohibited from ex­
pending sums of money on political campaigns, whatever the conse­
quences for the political process.260 
One could conceptualize these cases as presenting intractable 
problems for the self-governance rationale. If free speech were identi­
fied with self-governance, would self-governance be furthered by grant­
ing individual citizens maximum access to the political process, so that 
they could participate as freely as possible, or granting them equal ac­
cess to the political process, so that the participation of others did not 
dilute their contributions? This intractability can be associated with 
democratic theory itself, which posits both individualistic and egalita­
rian conceptions of citizen participation. 
But if campaign financing can be seen as conceptually intractable, 
it certainly had not been treated as doctrinally intractable by the Court 
prior to the 1970s. Legislative efforts to restrict campaign contributions 
and expenditures, on the part of both individuals and corporations, had 
been treated as unproblematic. They had been seen as prototypical leg­
islative allocations among economic rights in cases involving commer-
257. Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 260 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
258. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); First 
Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. 
259. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29. 
260. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790-92; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-59. 
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cial activity. Thus the unexpected dimensions of the First Amendment 
campaign finance cases, from the point of view of established free 
speech doctrine, were that the Court had swept a hitherto economic 
right into the category of a speech right and then concluded that the 
First Amendment required courts to intervene in the process of legisla­
tive allocations to protect the right to spend as much money on a cam­
paign as one chose. In one of the standard areas in which the bifurcated 
review project anticipated judicial deference - scrutiny of reasonable 
legislative allocations of economic activities undertaken in the name of 
democratic theory - the Court had read the First Amendment as re­
quiring judicial intervention. And since the beneficiaries of that inter­
vention were neither the traditional mavericks whose speech had been 
repressed nor other types of Carolene Products minorities habitually de­
nied access to the legislative forum, the Court's intervention, to those 
invested in the bifurcated review project, may well have appeared not 
only unexpected but, given the memory of Lochner, ominous. 261 
3. "Hate Speech" 
It is possible to see RA. V. v. City of St. Paul262 - in which the Su­
preme Court invalidated a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance applied to 
criminalize burning a cross on the front lawn of a black family as a 
means of communicating racial animus - as illustrating the same theo­
retical fragmentation of free speech jurisprudence typified by the other 
unexpected beneficiary cases. More fundamentally, it is possible to see 
the issues raised in RA. V. as evidence that free speech jurisprudence 
has begun to fragment because of the increasing incompatibility of the 
central premises of modernism. Two dimensions of RA. V. lend them­
selves to this line of analysis. One demonstrates that the case, like the 
previous unexpected beneficiary cases, presents a conflict between free­
dom and democratic theory. The other, which was present in a more 
muted form in the commercial speech and campaign finance cases, 
261. The problem with conceiving the contributions to and expenditures of politi­
cal campaigns as another example of speakers seeking to enter the marketplace of ideas 
is that the market of information about political candidates is not limitless. It is signifi­
cantly affected by the access of speakers to certain information outlets, such as the 
broadcast media, that dominate the market Money - generated by campaign contribu­
tions and expenditures - largely controls that access. Thus one could argue that even if 
a true marketplace of ideas exists for ordinary speech, sorting out popular from unpopu­
lar, true from false expressions, it does not exist with respect to information about polit­
ical campaigns. Instead, one has the equivalent of "market failure," justifying govern­
ment intervention to equalize the position of speakers through campaign finance 
restrictions. 
262. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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demonstrates that R.A. V. presents a conflict between freedom and equal­
ity. Locating the latter conflict in an intellectual history of free speech 
in the twentieth century requires a brief detour. 
a. The Emergence of the Equality Premise in First Amendment Ju­
risprudence. One of the central developments of constitutional jurispru­
dence from the 1950s through the 1980s was the growing momentum of 
arguments from the premise of radical equality, or what one commenta­
tor called the "antidiscrimination principle."263 Not only did the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment emerge as a constitu­
tional lodestar in those years,264 commentators began to suggest that the 
idea of equality was one of the foundations of free speech in 
America.265 A series of cases, those focusing on the concept of a "pub­
lic forum" for expression, made it plain that the antidiscrimination prin­
ciple had begun to radiate in First Amendment cases.266 
The idea of equality can also be associated with the cognitive free­
dom premise of modernist consciousness. If the innate cognitive capa­
bilities of humans were an important shaping force in the cosmos, it 
made sense to recognize the innate p9tential of all humankind, and thus 
not to treat some humans as worth more than others. At the same time, 
if tyranny and arbitrariness were
. 
to be checked, it made sense to give 
humans equal concern and respect. The momentum of egalitarianism 
and the antidiscrimination principle thus logically flowed from modern­
ist epistemological assumptions. 
But of course the antidiscrimination principle, with its accompany­
ing premise of radical human equality, could also be at odds with the 
premise of cognitive freedom. Indeed the association of equality with 
the idea of America as a democracy can be seen as potentially contrib­
uting to the severance of freedom from democratic theory. Treating all 
humans equally meant, arguably, giving equal respect to all human ex­
pressions, even if the content of those expressions was offensive to a 
majority of the citizens in a democracy, and even if that majority had 
263. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARV. L. REv. l (1976). By "radical equality" I simply mean the proposition that as a 
normative matter differences among human beings should presumptively be regarded as 
insignificant, so that policies that treat humans unequally are presumptively suspect. 
264. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 
90 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1991). 
265. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975). 
266. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 55-
72 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 849-70 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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"voted," in the form of a legislative enactment, to censure the offensive 
expressions. Thus the premise of radical human equality sometimes re­
inforced, and sometimes conflicted with, a theory of widespread protec­
tion for individual expression, and it sometimes reinforced, and some­
times conflicted with, the model of democratic politics in America. 
b. R.A.V. and the Puu.le of "Hate Speech." Given the cross-cur­
rents described above, R.A. V. can be seen as a complicated, possibly in­
tractable puzzle. Statutes proscribing hate speech, like all statutes distin­
guishing between higher value and lower value speech, offend the 
equality principle by labeling some ideas as not worth saying. They also 
arguably offend democratic theory because by excluding some ideas 
from public discourse they presumably deprive the proponents of those 
ideas of an opportunity to influence public policy. 
But the same statutes, in their content, arguably reinforce the an­
tidiscrimination principle as well. They also arguably reinforce the idea 
of democracy in America, at least if one adopts Meikle john's dictum 
that what is essential in a society dedicated to political self-government 
is "not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall 
be said. "267 
One could defend hate speech statutes, in fact, by starting from 
Meiklejohnian premises and merging them with arguments based on the 
antidiscrimination principle. One could argue that the expressions pro­
scribed by the St. Paul ordinance in RA. V. were precisely those that 
could be expected to offend others because they conveyed coarse ani­
mosities, or indulged in crude stereotypes, and thus denied the proposi­
tion that all persons in America should be treated with equal concern 
and respect. In seeking to eliminate such expressions from public dis­
course, the framers of the ordinance suggested that equality in America 
requires respect for others not only in theory but in practice. Moreover, 
by eliminating such expressions from public discourse, the ordinance 
arguably reinforced the principle of democratic self-government by 
designating certain worthless and distracting expressive activities as 
wasteful of the time and energies of a majority of the citizens, who 
should be encouraged to devote their limited resources to constructive 
activities that benefit the political community. 
In addition, the premise of cognitive freedom could cut both ways 
in RA. V. One could argue that hate speech ordinances infringe upon the 
self-fulfillment of the proscribed speakers. One could also argue, how-
267. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25. It should be pointed out that 
Meiklejohn also referred, in numerous places, to "[t]he unabridged freedom of public 
discussion." Id. at 91.  Thus it is not clear what he meant by "everything worth 
saying." 
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ever, that protection for hate speech legitimates that variety of speech, 
invites it into public debate, and creates the risk that those who do not 
share the animosities or who reject the stereotypes may be deterred 
from expressing their views. Finally, one could argue that unlimited 
protection for hate speech offends the freedom of the majority to be­
lieve that hate speech is wrong, harmful, and should no more be legiti­
mated than cigarettes or cocaine. 
Thus RA. V. can be shown to continue the pattern of theoretical 
fragmentation in free speech jurisprudence. R.A. V. implicitly asks the 
Court not only to decide whether it prefers freedom to democracy or to 
equality in First Amendment jurisprudence, but to decide what defini­
tions of freedom, democracy, and equality are compatible with the First 
Amendment. It is no wonder that RA. V. is the case most frequently as­
sociated with the emergence of a retrenchment in free speech jurispru­
dence, a retrenchment in which Wigmore's distinction between "free­
dom of speech and freedom of thuggery" and Meiklejohn's distinction 
between everyone speaking and everything worth saying have been 
revived. 
B. Sunstein and the Retrenchment of Free Speech Theory 
1 .  Retrenchment and the Bifurcated Review Project 
The elevation of self-fulfillment as a predominant First Amend­
ment value, the emergence of unexpected beneficiaries of First Amend­
ment protection, and the severance of freedom from democratic theory 
in free speech opinions from at least the 1 970s have thrown into ques­
tion a central assumption of bifurcated review: since economic alloca­
tions were properly the province of the legislature, judicial deference to 
legislative regulation of economic rights was appropriate, but First 
Amendment rights were not economic rights. To those with traditionally 
progressive or liberal political intuitions, these developments are fore­
boding. The First Amendment rights given protection by the Court in 
cases in the 1970s and 1980s included those of large campaign contrib­
utors, both individual and corporate, political action committees, and 
commercial advertisers. These were not only willing and powerful par­
ticipants in the economic marketplace, they were groups whose views 
had ample representation in legislatures and significant access to legis­
lators. In no sense were these beneficiaries of First Amendment protec-
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tion the powerless minorities of Carolene Products.268 They more re­
sembled the employers of bakery workers in Lochner. 
As freedom in First Amendment jurisprudence became succes­
sively severed from the other premises of modernism, conventional 
characterizations of those who favored aggressive judicial review in 
First Amendment cases and deferential review in economic regulation 
cases broke down. Judges pictured as conservatives joined Justices seen 
as liberals to form the majorities in the unexpected beneficiary cases.269 
It may have been this development coupled with the spectre of a dis­
cernible conservative, Justice Scalia, authoring the opinion in RA.V., 
that galvanized commentators into action. It may also have been some­
thing more ephemeral but also more fundamental: a sense that free 
speech jurisprudence was suddenly antifoundationalist, lacking theoreti­
cal rudders, "up for grabs. "270 If so, despite the apparent inexorability 
of First Amendment libertarianism over the course of the twentieth cen­
tury, a theoretical retrenchment might be possible. 
At any rate, the 1990s has produced a striking number of argu­
ments suggesting that the value of freedom for expressive activity can 
and should be qualified in the service of a more civil and less corrosive 
model for communities of discourse in America, a model in which civic 
responsibility and respect for others is taken at least as seriously as 
freedom and rights. Most of the arguments can be said to be associated 
with the issue of hate speech, especially if pornography, another area 
that has spawned calls for restrictions on expressive activity, is charac­
terized, as many of its opponents would characterize it, as a version of 
268. The yearning in the academic community as late as the 1980s to retain mo­
mentum for the project of bifurcated review can be seen in the wide acclaim generated 
by John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and Jesse Choper's Judicial Review and the 
National Political Process, two works that appeared in 1980 and were explicit attempts 
to engraft a Carolene Products exception on a general theory of deferential judicial re­
view in constitutional cases. The works shared the American Association of Law 
Schools' Order of the Coif Triennial Book Award in 1983. 
269. For example, Justice Blackmun, conventionally identified as a liberal on the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, was prominently involved in carving out protection for 
commercial speech, as was Justice Powell, conventionally identified as a conservative. 
For example, see Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In contrast, then-Justice Rehnquist initially opposed such 
protection and dissented in Virginia Pharmacy. 
270. That is surely the message of STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH TmNG AS 
FREE SPEECH (1994). The very intervention of Fish, a prominent antifoundationalist, 
into debates about free speech might be taken as a signal that foundational premises in 
First Amendment jurisprudence are under strain. The collapse of foundational premises 
in an area of scholarly discourse appears to energize Fish: see his comments on tradi­
tional standards of textual criticism in STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A Tmcr IN Tms 
CLASS? (1980). 
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hate speech in which women are invidiously stereotyped and 
degraded.271 
But at least one prominent commentator, Cass Sunstein, has called 
for a broader retrenchment of free speech jurisprudence, one intended to 
affect not only unexpected beneficiary cases but others he finds trouble­
some.272 Because Sunstein incorporates the contributions of opponents 
of hate speech into his own arguments and gives an extended theoretical 
justification for the reconfiguration of First Amendment jurisprudence 
he proposes, a focus on his work as representative of current retrench­
ment theory seems appropriate.273 
2. Sunstein and the Legacy of Speech-Protective Jurisprudence 
Here is how Sunstein sees the current world of First Amendment 
jurisprudence: 
In the last decade, the commitments that emerged from the previous gen­
eration of free speech law have come under severe strain. . . . There are 
abundant ironies in this. For one thing, the new coalitions have spurred 
plausible arguments of hypocrisy and brinkmanship. Free speech advo­
cates say that the liberal's commitment to free speech has been aban­
doned as soon as it turns out that the commitment is inconvenient, or re­
quires protection for causes that are unpopular with liberals . . . .  
On the other hand, the broad enthusiasm for application of free 
speech principles to the new settings seems ironic as well, especially 
when it comes from conservatives usually respectful of tradition and of 
the need for restrained use of the Constitution . . . .  Insistence on the pro­
tection of all words and pictures seems especially odd when it is urged 
by people who otherwise proclaim the need for judicial restraint.274 
271. I am thinking here of the contributions of Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, 
Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Crenshaw on hate speech and of Catharine MacKinnon 
on pornography and hate speech. See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMEND­
MENT (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
272. Sunstein lists, in addition to commercial advertising, campaign finance regu­
lation, hate speech (including pornography), "speech in connection with the sale of se­
curities, sexual and racial harassment in the workplace, scientific speech, nude dancing 
. . . and regulation designed to produce quality and diversity in broadcasting." CASS 
R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 14 (1993). 
273. In singling out Sunstein as representative of contemporary commentators ad­
vocating a retrenchment of free speech theory, I do not want to be understood as sug­
gesting that Sunstein's arguments and perspectives can be ranked, in some kind of hier­
archy of stature, above those articulated in the work of a number of other contemporary 
commentators on free speech. I have singled out Sunstein's work for the same reason I 
singled out that of Emerson: in my judgment his work most clearly embodies the theo­
retical orientation of free speech commentary at a particular point in time. 
274. SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 14-16. 
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But the fact that he perceives the current First Amendment land­
scape as chaotic, or ironic, is not what galvanizes Sunstein to propose a 
theoretical reconfiguration of free speech jurisprudence. It is that for 
self-described liberals such as Sunstein275 the landscape is politically 
threatening. The unexpected beneficiaries of recent libertarian free 
speech jurisprudence potentially force liberals either to abandon "the 
liberal's commitment to free speech" or to support "unpopular causes." 
Sunstein's response is to propose a retrenchment of the libertarian ten­
dencies of free speech theory so as to exclude from its coverage some 
of the unexpected beneficiaries of the last two decades. 
The most significant feature of Sunstein's retrenchment, from the 
perspective of this article, is not the substantive positions he endorses. 
He would virtually deny constitutional protection to violent pomogra­
phy ,276 to a limited category of hate speech ("fighting words" involving 
race, color, or creed),277 and to false or misleading commercial advertis­
ing.278 None of the previous commentators showed an inclination to 
protect those expressive activities,279 and support for their protection is 
overwhelmingly unpopular in the current academic community, at least 
among persons who define themselves, with Sunstein, as heirs to a lib­
eral tradition of support for free speech. 
In addition, Sunstein would permit government regulation of a 
number of expressive activities, including campaign contributions and 
expenditures, communications in the securities industry, scientific 
speech, and electronic broadcasting.280 Deference to government regula­
tion of speech in those areas can fairly said to be responsive to the fear 
that large corporations and wealthy individuals, traditional bogeymen of 
275. Sunstein associates himself with "the forms of liberalism" associated with 
"the commitment to 'government by discussion,' " by which he means, in free speech 
jurisprudence, commitment to the "idea . . . that . . . [l]iberal rights are pervasively 
democratic," and that "[o]ne of their prime functions is to furnish the preconditions for 
democratic deliberation." Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted). 
276. See id. at 225. 
277. See id. at 203-04. 
278. See id. at 135, 220. I use the phrase "virtually deny" with respect to com­
mercial advertising, violent pornography, and hate speech because Sunstein's approach 
would not completely exclude those activities from the domain of First Amendment law 
but rather would classify them as lower value, more regulable activities. See infra text 
accompanying notes 285-92. 
279. Even Emerson attempted to exclude "hard-core" or child pornography from 
the class of protected expressive activities on the ground that it constituted action rather 
than expression. See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 500-02. Emerson's discus­
sion of pornography revealed that he was reacting viscerally against the logic of his 
own libertarian theories of free speech. 
280. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 87-88, 99-101, 163-64. 
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those committed to the bifurcated review project, recently have been 
getting too much shelter from the First Amendment. 
The results Sunstein would reach in current free speech controver­
sies, in short, seem predictable consequences of a belief in an ideal of 
bifurcated constitutional review and an identification with the tradition 
of twentieth-century liberal reformist politics in America.281 More inter­
esting, from the perspective of this article, is the theoretical apparatus 
Sunstein proposes as a foundation for reframing free speech cases. That 
apparatus represents an effort to respond to the severance of freedom 
from democratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence by insisting 
that those premises be reconnected. Sunstein wants free speech jurispru­
dence once again to insist that only speech intimately connected to the 
processes of democracy receive full protection - that the only freedom 
at the core of the First Amendment is democratic freedom. When un­
packed, Sunstein 's perspective strikingly resembles that of Meikle john. 
In erecting his theoretical foundations Sunstein employs four re­
lated strategies. First, he asserts·that, under a "Madisonian" view of the 
Constitution and the First Amendment, the central purpose of American 
constitutional government is to further deliberative democracy.282 This 
means that he shares Meiklejohn's belief that " 'political speech' lies at 
the heart of constitutional concern. "283 But Meikle john's insistence that 
private (nonpolitical) speech was not covered by the First Amendment 
at all appears problematic to Sunstein, who chooses to "depart from 
Meiklejohn" at this point. 284 
Sunstein's conclusion that Meiklejohn's bright-line distinction be­
tween public and private speech was unworkable285 precipitates his sec­
ond strategy. Rather than entirely exclude nonpolitical speech from First 
Amendment protection, he revives the higher value-lower value catego­
rization, tying it to a "two-tier" approach to free speech cases. Sun­
stein's choice of the two-tier approach, in which even nonpolitical 
speech is afforded some level of protection, enables him to incorporate 
into his theoretical foundations for doctrinal retrenchment in free speech 
jurisprudence what he characterizes as a "New Deal" approach to con­
stitutional issues. That approach rejected absolutist conceptions of pri-
281. "With respect to freedom of expression," Sunstein maintains, "I think that 
American constitutionalism has failed precisely to the extent that it has not taken the 
New Deal reformation seriously enough." Id. at 34. 
282. See id. at 18. 
283. Id. at 122, 273 n.2. 
284. See id. 
285. Sunstein notes that Meiklejohn kept progressively expanding the meaning of 
public or political speech as new difficulties for his interpretation arose. See id. at 273. 
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vate (unregulable) and public (regulable) spheres of activity and recog­
nized that distributions of material and intellectual resources took place 
whenever the state chose to act or not to act.286 Sunstein proposes an 
analogous approach to speech issues. 
Sunstein's third strategy is to craft a syllogism in which his "delib­
erative democracy" theory of the First Amendment is linked to his two­
tier theory of speech. He argues that just as the New Deal approach to 
economic issues obliterated the notion of a private sphere immune from 
governmental regulation, free speech theory can obliterate two compa­
rable notions, that there is a class of private speech in which the First 
Amendment is not implicated at all, and that there is a class of public 
speech that the government must necessarily leave unregulated.287 
A two-tier approach to speech issues, according to Sunstein, would 
treat all speech as theoretically regulable, but would establish a cate­
gory of speech - "political" speech as Sunstein defines it - as pre­
sumptively free from regulation, with a very strong burden on govern­
ment to rebut that presumption. "Nonpolitical" speech would not be 
completely outside the ambit of First Amendment protection, but the 
government would bear a less severe burden of justifying its regulatory 
efforts.288 Thus Sunstein's approach revives the higher value-lower 
value distinction, but it includes even low value expressions within the 
ambit of the First Amendment. 
In order to develop his two-tier approach, Sunstein concededly 
needs to treat the distinction between political and nonpolitical speech 
as meaningful and central to First Amendment analysis. He is well 
aware that in order to do this he needs to revive Meiklejohn's self­
governance rationale as the central justification for freedom of speech, 
which means undercutting the self-fulfillment rationale. This leads him 
to his fourth strategy, that of reducing the significance of the value of 
self-fulfillment, or, in his terms, the "autonomy principle, "289 in free 
speech theory. 
Sunstein suggests that the logic of self-fulfillment "make[s] it dif­
ficult or impossible to distinguish . . . among different categories of 
speech."290 If "we protect speech because people want to talk [or lis­
ten]," Sunstein argues, "it is not easy to come up with standards by 
which to distinguish among different kinds of talk. "291 And if "we can-
286. See id. at 30-32. 
287. See id. at 35-38. 
288. See id. at 37-38, 132-37. 
289. See id. at 141. 
290. Id. 
291 .  Id. 
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not come up with such standards," an approach based on self­
fulfillment "will not be able to do what a theory of free speech is 
obliged to do, that is, to make distinctions among different categories of 
speech."292 So ultimately Sunstein's argument against autonomy be­
comes more than a justification for his categories of analysis; it be­
comes an insistence that when there are no standards for determining 
why some speech is afforded more constitutional protection than others, 
the very basis for singling out speech for constitutional protection is 
undermined. 
Having explored the strategies Sunstein employs in support of his 
two-tier approach to First Amendment issues, we are now in a position 
to locate his perspective in the intellectual history being set forth in this 
article. Sunstein proposes a retrenchment, a breaking of the libertarian 
momentum of free speech theory that has emerged in the period encom­
passing Emerson's The System of Freedom of Expression and the unex­
pected beneficiary cases. He grasps the potential conflict between free­
dom and democratic theory in free speech theory and seeks to 
reestablish an inextricable connection between free speech and the idea 
of democracy in America. In short, he seeks to repair the strains in 
modernist free speech jurisprudence. 
The analytical linchpins of Sunstein's proposed retrenchment - a 
two-tier approach to free speech cases in which the standard of judicial 
scrutiny varies and a higher value-lower value distinction between cate­
gories of speech that triggers the 
·
appropriate level of scrutiny - re­
quire that speech tied to deliberative democracy be elevated to a more 
protected position than other speech. Any other treatment of speech, for 
Sunstein, raises the spectre of the self-fulfillment rationale run wild, 
equating freedom with autonomy and severing it from the idea of de­
mocracy in America. 
With the appearance of Sunstein's proposed retrenchment of free 
speech theory, which has strong echoes of Meiklejohn, one is tempted 
to say that the twentieth-century intellectual history of First Amendment 
jurisprudence shows signs, at the century's close, of doubling back on 
itself. But the implications of a retrenchment in the libertarian progres­
sion of free speech theory may be quite different from what Sunstein 
may have intended. For although Sunstein openly identifies his re-
292. Id. One could argue, of course, that an "absolutist" view of protection for 
speech, in which all forms of expression are given constitutional protection, does not di­
minish the stature of speech. But the problem is that such an approach has never ex­
isted: there have always been some forms of speech capable of being suppressed. So 
there has always been an implicit valuing of the forms of speech given protection. Once 
those forms become almost limitless, it is not clear what makes them valuable. 
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trenchment with the Meiklejohn interpretation, the perspective he sup­
plies on free speech issues bears traces not only of Meiklejohn, but of 
the perspective exhibited by Wigmore in his criticism of Holmes's dis­
sent in Abrams. In order to grasp this dimension of Sunstein's retrench­
ment, we need to talce one more look, that of a concluding overview, at 
the twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech jurisprudence in 
America. 
CONCLUSION: THE DEATH OF FREE SPEECH? 
A. The Modernist Heritage of Free Speech Theory 
Wigmore's position in his critique of Holmes in Abrams - that 
leaflets directed toward workers in a munitions factory during wartime 
could be treated as the equivalent of what Holmes called "any other 
overt act we don't like"293 and suppressed as if they were bombs or any 
other examples of thuggery - proceeded, we have seen, from the pre­
mise that freedom of speech was simply another of the ancient rights 
and liberties of English-speaking citizens, liberties that could be sup­
pressed if they threatened the state itself. The difference between Wig­
more's and Holmes's perspectives toward the sort of speech implicated 
in Abrams was that Wigmore attached no special value to speech that 
distinguished it from other forms of activity. Holmes, on the other hand, 
associated "the ultimate good" in the universe with "free trade in 
ideas" and asserted that such an association was "the theory of the 
Constitution. "294 Holmes was thereby suggesting that cognitive free­
dom, as embodied in speech, ought to be treated as constitutionally and 
culturally privileged because it facilitated a search for truth on which 
rational policymaking ultimately was grounded. That conception of 
First Amendment freedom was associated, by Chafee, with "the social 
interest in attainment of truth. "295 
We have seen that Holmes's and Chafee's implicit definitions of 
the "meaning" of free speech followed from modernist premises. Thus 
one way to explain the early and mid-twentieth-century discovery of 
speech as a central cultural value, and the associated elevation of First 
Amendment rights to a status of high constitutional significance, is to 
see them as consequences of the broad acceptance in America of mod­
ernist causal explanations of experience. 
293. Holmes made this statement as late as 1918, before writing his dissent in 
Abrams. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Harold J. Laski (July 7, 1918) in 1 
HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS, supra note 63, at 160, 161. 
294. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
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But at the same time we have seen that the modernist-inspired per­
spective on free speech advanced by Holmes in Abrams and synthesized 
by Chafee in Freedom of Speech was by no means orthodoxy in the 
early twentieth century. On the contrary, the perspective on free speech 
illustrated by Wigmore's critique, the roots of which we have seen in 
premodernist theories of causal attribution, exhibited remarkable staying 
power as an orthodoxy, as it was not displaced until the 1930s. The 
controlling evaluative standard for subversive activities cases remained 
bad tendency until that decade, and that standard had its own roots in 
the orthodox late nineteenth-century perspective embodied in Wig­
more's critique of the Abrams dissent. 
Thus it would be erroneous to assert that the idea of speech being 
culturally and constitutionally special in America had become en­
trenched in the first three decades of the twentieth century, although 
that idea was growing in momentum. It also would be erroneous to 
claim that the central premises of modernism had become widely inter­
nalized in American culture in those decades. Those premises were in 
the air between 1900 and 1930, especially among progressive intellectu­
als, but in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence they competed with 
premodernist premises. Lochner, after all, was revived in Adkins v. 
Children's HospitaP.96 in the 1920s and remained orthodoxy in due pro­
cess cases until 1937.297 
The appearance of Meiklejohn's Free Speech in 1948 can be taken 
as signifying that modernist premises had come to control the orienta­
tion of free speech jurisprudence, and that enhanced protection for free 
speech was the driving force in the bifurcated review project. 
Meiklejohn's elevation of self-governance to the primary rationale for 
protecting freedom of speech, his substitution of the town meeting met­
aphor for the now pejorative marketplace of ideas metaphor, his bright­
line distinction between "public" and "private" speech, and his explicit 
linking of the cultural value of free speech to democratic theory were 
each signals that the intellectual history of free speech jurisprudence in 
America had entered another phase. In particular, they were signals that 
modernist assumptions about the close connections b"tween free 
speech, a democratic model of politics, and the conditions of modernity 
- the same assumptions that had driven the intuitive characterization 
of First Amendment rights as occupying a preferred constitutional posi­
tion - had become embodied in a self-contained, comprehensive per­
spective on free speech. 
296. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
297. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins). 
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The modernist premises of Meiklejohn's perspective, we have 
seen, were that in a universe in which humans had come to be thought 
of as the principal causal agents affecting their destiny, and in a nation 
whose governmental system presupposed a democratic model of polit­
ics, speech was more than just an activity in which Americans partici­
pated. The free expression of ideas, channeled along the lines of empiri­
cal inquiry and rational policymaking, was a precondition to effective 
governance in America. Freedom of speech, as the preferred position 
cases suggested, was an indispensable requirement of democratic 
theory. 
Chafee and Holmes had started with similar premises. But 
Meiklejohn had developed them into a fullblown interpretation of the 
First Amendment. That interpretation contamed an overriding rationale 
for protecting speech; an explicit linking of cognitive freedom to demo­
cratic theory; an explicit association of enhanced judicial protection for 
public speech with the bifurcated review project; and, with the legacy 
of Lochner in mind, an analytical formula for including and excluding 
given categories of expression from First Amendment protection. That 
formula encapsulated the intuitive judicial efforts, in the preferred posi­
tion cases, to distinguish high value from low value speech. 
1\vo additional features of the Meiklejohn interpretation, both pre­
viously discussed, underscore its modernist dimensions. One was that it 
was incompatible with the perspective on speech I have associated with 
premodemist jurisprudential orthodoxy. For Meiklejohn, First Amend­
ment speech rights could never be lined up against state police powers 
in the fashion of nineteenth-century doctrinal analysis because of their 
special constitutional and cultural status. The problem with Holmes's 
clear and present danger standard was that it had echoes of this police 
power analytic. Meiklejohn assumed that political speech could never 
pose a clear and present danger to the American government because it 
was the principal foundation of that government.298 Meiklejohn's cate­
gory of constitutionally protected speech thus could come to equal what 
Wigmore called thuggery. Once the premises of the Meiklejohn inter­
pretation were granted, Wigmore's belief that some concededly political 
expressions nonetheless could be suppressed because they offended the 
social interest in preserving order, civilized discourse, and morality was 
necessarily abandoned. Meiklejohn, in fact, had gone well beyond 
Holmes.299 
298. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 89-91.  
299. Meiklejohn directed a fair amount of his energy in Free Speech to disassoci­
ating his perspective from the theory of free speech he ascribed to Holmes, and he in-
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The other feature of Meiklejohn's Free Speech that signals wide 
acceptance of the premises of modernist consciousness was 
Meiklejohn's blithe conviction that his formula for deciding speech 
cases posed few significant conceptual and practical difficulties. 
Meiklejohn, and those who followed his interpretation, proceeded as if 
everyone knew which types of expressions qualified as public or pri­
vate, higher or lower value speech. Although Meiklejohn progressively 
extended his category of public expressions, he took as beyond dispute 
the fundamental distinction between private and public speech and 
sought to solve particular free speech puzzles, such as the status of liter­
ary or artistic expression, within the distinction's parameters. 
The progression of free speech jurisprudence from Meiklejohn 
through Emerson to the unexpected beneficiary cases, however, sug­
gests that the original premises that drove the enshrinement of freedom 
of speech as a constitutional and cultural value had lost their integrated, 
self-reinforcing quality. As First Amendment jurisprudence has become 
increasingly speech protective, freedom as autonomy or self-fulfillment 
has taken on emotive as well as cognitive dimensions and has separated 
itself, and come to compete with, freedom as self-governance. And as 
the assumed naturalness of Meiklejohnian doctrinal categories, which 
prevented economic rights from taking on the stature of speech rights, 
has collapsed, an important modernist function of speech-protective 
First Amendment jurisprudence, that of nourishing and sustaining the 
bifurcated review project, has been threatened. 
These developments may well signify the fracturing of the central 
premises of modernist American constitutional jurisprudence, premises 
that helped channel constitutional doctrine300 along the familiar and re­
assuring paths created by modernist American jurisprudence - the 
paths of empiricist inquiry and rational policymaking within a demo­
cratic model of politics. In the unexpected beneficiary cases, and in 
other cases, most conspicuously obscenity cases, Meiklejohnian catego-
eluded in his discussion an extended critique of the clear and present danger standard. 
See, e.g., id. at 70-90. 
300. I believe that the judicially deferential treatment of legislation challenged 
under the Commerce Clause or Due Process Clauses - the other prong of the original 
bifurcated review project - can also be fruitfully analyzed from the perspective 
adopted in this article. I am currently pursuing that project and might venture, at this 
point, that evidence suggests that the elevation of Holmes's 1905 critique of Lochner to 
juristic orthodoxy in Supreme Court due process cases in the late 1 930s, and the analo­
gous development of deferential judicial review in Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 
the same time period, can be closely linked to the transformation of the central premises 
of modernist consciousness, at least among elite judges and legal commentators, from a 
marginal and contested cultural status to one of intellectual orthodoxy. 
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ries of speech have been blurred, and the assumption that eventually ei­
ther the marketplace of ideas or the processes of self-government will 
subject expression to empiricist or rationalist constraints appears to 
have been abandoned. In some of those cases speech, now expanded to 
include emotive as well as cognitive expressions, appears to be pro­
tected simply because it is an embodiment of the feelings or tastes of an 
individual. 
B. The Shadow ofWigmore: Premodernist Free Speech Theory and 
Retrenchment 
Sunstein has recognized that if everyone can speak on any subject, 
not only does no intelligible governing theory of free speech exist, but 
speech itself has ceased to be regarded as special. Meiklejohn took that 
proposition as a given and sought to implement it by identifying a cate­
gory of speech that needed to be given constitutionally protected status 
in a modern, democratic society, and by protecting ·only that speech. If 
the modernist premises that guided Meiklejohn seem as much self­
opposing as self-reinforcing, or even potentially unintelligible, perhaps 
one is left only with the autonomy of individual speakers and listen­
ers. 301 How, then, does contemporary free speech jurisprudence avoid 
conferring First Amendment protection on everyone, and thus arguably 
robbing free speech of its special status in America? 
That question tempts Sunstein to revive the Meiklejohn interpreta­
tion as a guide for retrenchment. But Meiklejohn's perspective was not 
formulated in a vacuum. As a historical actor, situated in his own time, 
Meiklejohn can be said to have stood in the shadow of Wigmore and 
those who had invested in the premodernist premises of early twentieth­
century theoretical orthodoxy in free speech jurisprudence. Meiklejohn, 
of course, rejected those premises, but he supplanted them with a com­
parably strongly held set of his own. His conviction that only public 
speech need be protected, since only that form of speech embodied the 
301 .  For example, if one treats truth and rationality as ideological, socially con­
structed, and contingent concepts, one can hardly expect them to channel speech con­
sistently in the direction of wise collective public decisions, at least in Meiklejohn's 
sense. Thus if wisdom is taken to be the equivalent of short-run, ideologically depen­
dent constructions of current experience, one might as well let everyone speak and 
count all speech of equal value. Wisdom will emerge anyway, the product not of the in­
herent cogency of any expression but of a series of predetermined interpretive canons or 
culturally imposed ideological boundaries. Under such postmodernist conditions one 
could argue that in America, at least, it is more consistent with egalitarian and antitotal­
itarian traditions, as well as the text of the Constitution, to let everyone speak on any 
subject rather than having government powerholders dictate the parameters of protected 
speech. 
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special cultural and constitutional status of the First Amendment, was 
just as confidently maintained as Wigmore's conviction that he and his 
contemporaries could easily discern the line between speech and 
thuggery. 
What Wigmore and Meiklejohn shared in common, then, was a set 
of foundational premises that enabled them to know the boundaries be­
tween protected and unprotected expression. The premises were radi­
cally different, but their assumed foundational status was similar. 
Alongside that one might compare Justice Harlan's statement in Cohen 
v. California that "we think it is largely because governmental officials 
cannot make principled distinctions in [the] area [of expression] that the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the 
individual. "302 
So neither Sunstein, nor any of us, can wholly restore Meikle john's 
interpretation of the First Amendment because we cannot wholly restore 
his intellectual and contextual universe. Our foundational premises, if 
we have any, are not his. Indeed one of the arguably troubling features 
of the collapse of Meiklejohn's categorization scheme, the progression 
of free speech libertarianism, and the fragmentation of First Amend­
ment jurisprudence is that it acquaints us to the possibility that no over­
reaching perspective on free speech issues can be formulated, because 
there is currently no agreement as to the foundational premises on 
which such a perspective might be built. 
Suppose, then, that First Amendment jurisprudence is destined to 
be in a fragmented state for at least the balance of this century. Sup­
pose, further, that a group of potentially influential commentators, the 
retrenchment theorists, are deeply troubled by that possible trend, either 
because of their ideological distaste for the results in the unexpected 
beneficiary cases, or because of the threat those cases pose for the pro­
ject of bifurcated constitutional review, or, more fundamentally, be­
cause of their belief in the proposition that when everyone can speak 
and anything can be said freedom of speech may well lose its special 
place in American civilization. 
Then a retrenchment may be attempted, but it cannot replicate 
Meiklejohn's universe. It can only take place in the universe of the last 
years of the twentieth century: a universe in which the foundationalist 
premises that elevated modernism to a position of influence are, at best, 
contested. Given our current epistemological climate, what confidence 
can one have that the foundational premises of Sunstein 's retrenchment 
- that speech associated with deliberative democracy be favored, that a 
302. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
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two-tier theory of protection for speech be implemented, that autonomy 
be abandoned as a central First Amendment principle - will be ac­
cepted? Each bristles with conceptual and practical difficulties in appli­
cation, difficulties akin to those that Meiklejohn ignored.303 Perhaps 
those difficulties could be solved in the short run if each of us shared 
Sunstein's commitments to the liberal political agenda of the New Deal 
and to the accompanying bifurcated review project. But the emergence 
of unexpected candidates for First Amendment protection, candidates 
incompatible with the original ideological orientation of bifurcated re­
view, itself suggests that Sunstein's commitments are not universally 
shared. 
Sunstein, doubtless aware that he cannot assume that the founda­
tional premises of his retrenchment approach will be treated as un­
problematic, has, we have seen, advanced another justification for mod­
ifying the libertarian emphasis of current free speech theory. Here is 
where I find the shadow of Wigmore lurking most prominently. Sun­
stein has combined two arguments in his justification. One argument is 
that libertarian free speech jurisprudence fails sufficiently to recognize 
that what is special about speech in America is its indispensable con­
nection to democratic deliberation. The other argument is that the pro­
gression of libertarian free speech jurisprudence ultimately may become 
so overprotective of speech as to rob speech of its special constitutional 
and cultural status. 
The two arguments could be combined to reach the conclusion that 
if one wants to preserve the special status of speech in America, there 
303. To take just one example, how does Sunstein's reformulation of free speech 
theory solve the problem of hate speech, one of his central concerns? Composed of ster­
eotyping assertions and generalizations, hate speech unmistakably expresses an ideolog­
ical point of view, and even holds up a vision of a "good society," one that creates a 
social hierarchy resting on the truth of such generalizations. It is thus clearly political 
speech and would seem to be speech inviting dialogue and deliberation. Sunstein, how­
ever, would not protect at least two forms of hate speech: speech associated with hate 
crimes, such as the burning of a cross on the property of a black family protected in 
R.A.V., that is "limited to the exceedingly narrow category of unprotected fighting 
words," and speech in a college or university that is singled out as "incompatible with 
[the institution's] educational mission." SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 192, 203. 
Such an approach revives the older, and arguably shaky, Chaplinsky categorization 
of high and low value speech - after Cohen, one person's fighting words may now be 
another's music, and after R.A. V. that categorization cannot support viewpoint-discrimi­
natory restrictions on hate speech. It then adds an undefended assertion that the state, as 
in R.A. V., has a greater interest in suppressing speech that causes anger on the basis of 
race, color, or creed, than on the basis, say, of gender, sexual preference, size, or age. 
One may agree completely with Sunstein's analysis of hate speech cases. The point 
is simply that his categorization of protected speech seems as capable of being con­
tested as that advanced by Meiklejohn. 
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seems no reason to give significant constitutional protection to those ex­
pressive activities that are taken to be largely unconnected to the demo­
cratic governmental process. There also seems ample reason to allow 
those institutions that allegedly personify democracy and reflect 
majoritarian views - legislatures - to restrict individual forms of ex­
pression if they conclude that the expressions in question bear no rea­
sonable connection to the process of deliberative democracy. Under this 
approach certain expressions might become candidates for restriction 
because a majority of the public deemed them so inherently lacking in 
stature as to not be worth deliberating about. 
Treating speech in this fashion bears a striking resemblance to the 
treatment of speech cases in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
police power cases, in which, as we as seen, individual constitutional 
rights, whether implicating expression or not, were subordinated to gov­
ernment interests in restricting them, such as morality, order, and de­
cency. In Wigmore's hands such an approach easily sanctioned a legis­
lative determination that certain kinds of expressive activities - such 
as those engaged in by the defendants in Abrams - exemplified not 
freedom of speech but freedom of thuggery. An approach that elevates 
freedom of speech to an advantaged position primarily because it rein­
forces deliberative democracy claims to be just as capable of identifying 
what an appropriate subject for deliberation is as Wigmore was capable 
of knowing when an expression amounted to thuggery.304 
C. The Paradox of Current Free Speech Theory 
The intellectual history set forth in this article helps explain the 
ways in which the proposed retrenchment of free speech jurisprudence, 
as exemplified in Sunstein's work, has echoes of both Meiklejohn and 
Wigmore. Sunstein expresses the hope that many of the discomforting 
results of progressive libertarianism in First Amendment jurisprudence 
304. Sunstein, of course, is not situated in the same point in time as Wigmore: he 
advances his theories against the backdrop of a much more speech-protective First 
Amendment jurisprudence. His two-tier theory of speech appears to include a number 
of expressions as presumptive candidates for protection that Wigmore might have al­
lowed legislatures categorically to restrict. But the shadow of Wigmore can nonetheless 
be said to fall upon Sunstein, as it did upon Meiklejohn. For Sunstein's two-tier theory 
of protection for speech to work smoothly, those implementing it need to have confi­
dence that everyone will be able to discern the boundary between those expressions that 
implicate deliberative democracy and those that do not, just as Wigmore's contemporar­
ies were able confidently to discern the boundary between speech and thuggery. But 
that very difficulty in erecting confident boundaries in free speech jurisprudence is ar­
guably what has precipitated the recent explosion of libertarian, unexpected beneficiary 
decisions. 
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can be alleviated by a retrenchment premised on narrowing the constitu­
tional and cultural meaning of speech in America. He offers that solu­
tion as a guide for the twenty-first century, but the solution also has the 
potential to restore something like the treatment of speech that 
predominated before the First Amendment came of age. A retrenchment 
of free speech jurisprudence in the 1990s thus might bring the century 
of the First Amendment in America to a close in more than one sense. 
A century earlier, speech in America was treated as one of the 
time-honored liberties of English-speaking peoples. Spe,ech was no 
more immune from government restrictions than any of those other lib­
erties. That was the very conception of speech that Meiklejohn classi­
fied as Fifth Amendment speech and sought to distinguish from the 
First Amendment, public, unabridgable speech that he argued was indis­
pensably connected to self-governance in a democratic society. 
Of course Meiklejohn could sustain his faith that some speech was 
unabridgable because of his conviction that the category of public 
speech was easy to discern. Developments since the appearance of Free 
Speech undermined that assumption. As the category of public speech 
got broader and broader, it became apparent that the expressions of 
many individuals were being protected not because of their relevance to 
public debate but because of their connection to the principle of human 
cognitive and emotive freedom. At that point freedom came to be seen 
as implicated in some unexpected contexts, and the impulse toward re­
trenchment began. 
Thus the paradox that current free speech theorists are confronting 
is as follows: If one returns to a First Amendment jurisprudence in 
which some expressions, by not furthering deliberative democracy or 
meeting some other inclusionary criterion, are excluded from being can­
didates for protection, one threatens to revive the categorical apparatus 
for evaluating speech claims that resulted in speech rights being treated 
as nothing special in late nineteenth-century America. On the other 
hand, if one endorses the current libertarian progression of free speech 
theory, emphasizing the connection between speech and individual au­
tonomy in a pluralistic society, one appears to invite a world in which 
anyone can talk on any subject; speech thus becomes the equivalent of 
noise, and free speech theory becomes unintelligible. In neither in­
stance, arguably, is free speech in America continuing to be treated as 
special, continuing to be invested with the stature that the premises of 
modernist consciousness conferred upon it. 
I share some of the ideological goals of retrenchment theorists, 
such as desiring a society in which the level of human discourse, and 
the instincts and attitudes reflected in that discourse, becomes less 
392 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:299 
coarse and more respectful of others. I also am opposed to some of 
those goals, such as the project of channeling individual thoughts and 
expressions into the rubrics of deliberative democracy, rubrics I find ei­
ther confining or not easily intelligible. I am less disturbed than Sun­
stein about the momentum of self-fulfillment in First Amendment juris­
prudence, and the ideological perspective from which I address free 
speech issues is less invested in the symbols of the New Deal and the 
bifurcated review project than his. 
But the purpose of this article has not been to offer specific sug­
gestions about the resolution of contemporary First Amendment issues, 
or to advance any overriding theoretical perspective on free speech. It 
has been, rather, to place in historical perspective the paradox con­
fronting contemporary commentators on free speech issues, so as to 
gain some enhanced understanding of the predicament in which those of 
us who teach and write about the First Amendment at the end of the 
century in which it came of age find ourselves. The problem of the rela­
tionship of hate speech cases to the constitutional and cultural status of 
free speech in America, with which this article began, is just one sym­
bol of that predicament. Behind it lies a rich, suggestive, and currently 
troubling intellectual history. 
